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Executive Summary 
 
In order to develop carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology and deploy it in 
time to mitigate the worst effects of climate change many more CCS facilities must be 
constructed.  The IEA CCS Roadmap suggests that 100 large projects will be required 
by 2020 and 3,400 large projects by 2050 (IEA 2009).  This massive scaling-up of 
activity is well recognised by industry and government, and it is increasingly being 
recognised that the public is a key stakeholder in this process.  Since 2008, a number 
of small- to large-scale CCS projects going through the planning process began to 
encounter opposition from local communities and were either cancelled or have gone 
ahead in a reduced form due to local public opposition.   
 
The purpose of this report is to stimulate the design of effective engagement strategies 
between the public and proponents of CCS projects in Scotland.  Engagement is the 
process of having an informed, two-way discussion as to whether a CCS project is 
appropriate in a particular locality and context.  Successful engagement is not a 
guarantee that every project will go ahead.  Projects may be rejected by publics even 
if they are technically viable, and establishing if this is the case early on would greatly 
speed the search for a suitable site.  However if the reasons for a CCS project are 
sound, the plans carefully laid, and social conditions favourable, a good engagement 
strategy should greatly increase the chances of acceptance.  Key steps towards public 
acceptance have been identified (Figure I).  Whilst not every step will be necessary 
for every stakeholder, during an engagement campaign this is the likely minimum 
information which will be required.  
 
This report delivers a non-prescriptive approach to designing an engagement and 
communications or outreach strategy. For example, options ranging from zero public 
input to very high levels of public input are described and the arguments given for 
each.  Common public concerns with CCS are described and issues arising from 
aspects of the CCS chain are listed.  Most notably, offshore storage seems preferred to 
onshore storage, although there is currently little empirical evidence to back this up.   
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Figure I. Steps towards public acceptance of CCS projects. 
 
The focus of this report is at the local to sub-national level – i.e. individual projects 
and engaging with local publics and stakeholders.  Engagement with the wider public 
on what CCS is and why it may be necessary is extremely useful and important in 
preparing local communities and stakeholders and enabling them to make informed 
decisions about individual projects.  There is at present a gap in that no organisation 
has advanced this goal national level public engagement (either in Scotland or the UK 
as a whole).  Such a process would also help to align public understanding of the role 
of CCS within wider policy attempts to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and provide a 
forum for the public at large to decide if it is indeed an approach they wish to endorse.  
 
Best practice on engagement globally has been delivered by the seven Regional 
Carbon Sequestration Partnerships (RCSPs) in the USA which has generated a wealth 
of valuable experience.  A more systematic approach to public and stakeholder 
engagement at the EU scale is greatly needed. One of the key findings of the RCSPs 
is that public understanding of technical issues is not as important as is commonly 
believed by industry and government.  Rather, public trust in the developer, regulators 
and government (at various levels) to:  
• deliver truthful information and a safe project;   
• operate a transparent and fair decision-making process;  
• be accountable should things go wrong; and, 
•  to treat local publics fairly in the distribution of economic benefits and any 
hazards; 
What?  Basic knowledge of CCS – what it is, what it does and why 
Where?  Social Fit: History, Place 
Identity, Development Fatigue & the 
Local Economy 
How?  Project 
Details: Benefits, 
Risks & Nuisances 
Why?  Understanding of Climate Change & Options for Energy Generation 
Who?  Trust in Developer, Government etc.  to 
deliver a safe project and trust that fair redress will 
be available if necessary. 
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turned out to be more important than technical information on the project detail or risk 
assessment.  This is not to imply that hazards and risks of environmental and health 
and safety impacts are not of concern to communities.  It does suggest, however, that 
the sense of empowerment enjoyed by a community  – that is, the degree to which it 
has a ‘voice’ which is heard by the powerful (‘those in charge’) – has a strong 
influence over its willingness to embrace unknown technologies.  
 
Locations and communities differ greatly, even within a small geographic area, and 
the ‘social fit’ of a project in its local context can be an important indicator of 
potential public acceptance or opposition.  Relevant factors can be assessed through 
social characterisation, including: local relationships (historic and contemporary) with 
the fossil fuel and energy industries; the suitability of the project to the character of a 
place (e.g. rural idyll or industrial town); reactions to other recent infrastructural 
developments; and the fit with the needs of the local economy (including any 
compensation which might be part-and-parcel of a development).  
 
Successful engagement strategies have maintained a civil dialogue between publics / 
stakeholders and developers, have often involved independent expert and stakeholder 
endorsement, and have created transparent, participative processes for decision-
making.  Public trust in a developer can be lost when it is thought that: information is 
being withheld, the public’s concerns are not being taken seriously and/or that risks 
are not being thoroughly assessed.  Once public trust in a developer is lost it is very 
hard to regain, and constructive dialogue becomes much more difficult and, in some 
cases, impossible.  Without constructive dialogue, positions may become polarised 
into either support or opposition, and an impasse may be reached. 
 
This report provides the theory and practice for implementing good engagement and 
communication strategies and for maintaining positive developer-public and 
stakeholder relations.  Key concerns for publics are summarised and key issues 
arising from analysis of CCS cases are discussed in the context of literature on 
engagement and the planning process.  Tools in the design of an engagement strategy 
are outlined and practical resources such as different engagement techniques, 
communication and outreach materials and working with the media are listed.  Where 
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appropriate we provide references to other useful resources.  The document guide 
below (table 1) presents a summary of the topics covered and guides the reader to the 
appropriate location in the document and sources of further information. 
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Document Guide 
Topic or Issue Section  Location in 
Report   
Description and Notes  Further Resources 
Background 
Definitions of key terms Box 1 p.13 Definitions of key terms including 
engagement, communication, publics, 
stakeholders. 
 
Levels analysis; the need for 
wider engagement 
Section 1.2 
Figure 1 
pp.14-19 
p.16 
Engagement operates at different levels 
from local to international – but who delivers 
what is not so clear.  
Ashworth et al (2007); 
Reiner (2008). 
Analysis of CCS and gas 
case studies   
Table 2 
Section 2.2 
Annex 1 
pp.21-25 
pp.26-34 
pp.105-156 
Summary table 
Key observations 
Detailed case summaries. 
Desbarats et al (2010); 
Total (2008). 
Findings from CCS public 
perceptions research   
Table 3 
Table 4 
Section 2.3 
pp.36-37 
pp.38-39 
pp.35-43 
Key concerns from hypothetical CCS  
Key concerns from actual CCS cases 
Discussion of studies 
See Tables 3 and 4. 
Useful concepts in 
understanding public 
responses  
Section 
2.3.2.1 
Section 
2.3.2.2 
pp.43-44 
 
pp.44-45 
Trust, fairness and accountability 
 
NIMBYism and place identity 
Bradbury et al (2009) 
 
Divine-Wright (2009) 
Towards an Engagement Strategy 
Different styles of decision 
making (degrees of public 
participation) 
Table 6 
Section 3.1.1 
p.49 
pp.48-54 
Summary table of main styles 
Description and discussion of styles 
Held (1987); Van 
Zwandenberg and 
Millstone (2005) 
Engagement for different 
purposes 
Figure 6 
Section 3.1.3 
p.57 
pp.56-57 
From engagement for pure research to 
engagement for a real project. 
Summary figure and discussion. 
 
Risk Communication Box 2 
Section 3.1.2 
p.56 
pp.54-56 
Communicating risk to non-technical 
audiences. Summary box and discussion. 
IRGC (2005) 
Designing an engagement Figure 7 p.59 Summary: the elements of a strategy NETL (2009) 
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strategy  Section 3.2.1 
Figures 8-10 
pp.58-69 
 
pp.60-62 
Descriptions and discussion of elements 
 
Examples of different strategies. 
Matching engagement and 
project timelines 
Section 3.2.3 
Figure 11 
p.71 Early and continued engagement matched 
to technical and regulatory project timelines 
Bellona (2009), NETL 
(2009) pp.38-41.  
Early engagement  Box 3 p.65 Social characterisation Wade and Greenberg 
(2009) 
Stakeholder Engagement  Box 4 
Box 5 
p.66 
p.67 
Criteria for an inclusive process 
Info box on stakeholder identification. 
NETL (2009), pp. 17-
22; 
IRGC (2005) 
Media Engagement Box 8  p.82 Info box on media engagement NETL (2009), p. 23, p. 
47; US NIST (2002) 
Evaluation of the engagement 
process 
Box 7 
Table 7 
p.70 
p.70 
Example criteria by which to evaluate the 
outcomes and process of an engagement 
campaign. 
Rowe & Frewer (2000)  
Best practice guidelines for 
engagement and 
communication 
Table 8 pp.72-77 Summarises key points and main uses of 
various sets of guidelines for CCS 
engagement and communication 
campaigns. 
See Table 8.  
Implementing a campaign 
The CCS Chain Table 9 pp.78-81 Breaks down CCS into the relevant 
component variables and examines likely 
issues arising from each.  
 
Engagement techniques  Table 10 pp.83-88 Strengths, weaknesses and examples of the 
various engagement techniques 
See Table 10 
Communication and outreach 
techniques 
Table 11 pp.89-93 Strengths, weaknesses and examples of the 
various communication techniques 
Reiner (2008), US 
NIST (2002), NETL 
(2009) 
Materials for use in outreach 
and communication  
Table 12 pp.94-96 List of existing publicly available resources 
for communicating CCS to publics. 
See Table 12 
Table 1 A guide to the contents of the report.  We also refer the reader to selected high quality guidance on aspects of CCS public engagement, 
outreach and communication. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) is viewed by many governments, 
businesses and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as an essential part of the 
solution to mitigate the worst effects of climate change.  It is such an attractive 
solution because it holds the potential to abate between 15 and 50% of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 (IPCC 2001, IEA 2009), and it permits the 
continuation of fossil fuel burning for power, which delivers security of supply and a 
steady base load without requiring the shift to a radically different energy system.  
Carbon dioxide capture and storage also has its detractors, who consider that the 
continuation of fossil fuel use is an argument against CCS and that resources would 
be better spent developing and deploying more sustainable energy systems such as 
wind, solar or tidal.  Critics of CCS regard it as costly and unproven, doubt the long 
term integrity of carbon stores and argue that it contributes to carbon lock-in 
(Shackley & Thompson, forthcoming).   
 
At present, five industrial scale and more than a dozen smaller scale CCS facilities 
have deployed, tested, and demonstrated the technology in action.  Some facilities 
have demonstrated aspects of the entire chain (e.g.  only carbon capture), and some 
have demonstrated the entire chain (IEA 2009).  Developing the technology is 
essential to bringing down costs, and verifying the predictions of carbon dioxide 
(CO) behaviour once injected is essential to the long term efficacy of CCS. 
 
In order to develop the technology and deploy it in time to reduce GHGs to a level 
considered to avoid dangerous climate change, many more CCS facilities must be 
constructed.  The IEA CCS Roadmap suggests that 100 large projects will be required 
by 2020 and 3,400 large projects by 2050 (IEA 2009).  This massive scaling-up of 
activity is well recognised by industry and government, and it is also being 
increasingly recognised that the public is a key stakeholder in this process.  A number 
of proposed facilities have been cancelled or have gone ahead in a much reduced form 
due to local public opposition.   
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1.1 The Scope of This Report 
 
The purpose of this report is to help in the design of effective engagement strategies 
for CCS projects.  This entails factors specifically relevant to CCS – such as the safety 
concerns arising from onshore storage – and factors relevant to any new infrastructure 
project – such as the degree of public input into decisions.  We review public 
perceptions of and reactions to CCS projects, and draw upon insights gained from the 
wider literature on public engagement and responses to infrastructure developments.  
We make explicit different modes of engagement and other factors which influence 
the design of an engagement campaign.  Finally, we cover the more practical 
components such as communication and engagement techniques and materials already 
developed which can be used to inform publics about CCS. 
 
Engagement is a two-way process of providing information and collecting responses 
to it – what is done with the responses collected varies.  This report is not a set of 
‘best practice guidelines’ stating what should be done: these have been written, are 
based upon strong evidence and are listed in Table 8.  The present report lays out all 
the different options and choices to be made in designing an engagement strategy; 
lists factors influencing public responses and the evidence upon which they have been 
based.  We hope that an engagement strategy based upon well informed decisions will 
be a good engagement strategy.   
 
The focus is at the individual project level, and as such we do not discuss in detail the 
options for engagement at national level (although this would be a valuable step 
towards facilitating CCS deployment). We do however outline the need for more 
strategic thinking – and action – around wider engagement and CCS.   
 
We focus particularly on public responses and less so on other stakeholders for the 
reasons that stakeholder responses are fairly well understood and most developers 
already have set practices for dealing with stakeholders.  Where guidelines have 
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already been written we do not seek to re-write them; we have guided the reader 
instead to the relevant section of the relevant document.   
 
Box 1: Key Definitions 
Communication:  The use of remote or direct means to convey a one way flow of 
information.  A range of media can be used, though the most frequent are pre-
prepared written and audio-visual material.   
Engagement:  Undertaking a two-way process of communication and interaction 
between a proponent (developer, government department, etc.) and an affected party – 
e.g.  stakeholders, lay public, local community, sub-group of the community, etc.   
Public:  the lay population who are not organised in formal groups.  The public is 
split into the affected public (experiencing a direct impact from the project) and the 
observing public (not directly impacted)  
Stakeholders: socially organised groups that are, or will be, affected by the outcome 
of the event or activity and/or by the management options taken in response to that 
activity.   
Outreach:   the use of written or audio-visual media to communicate with a target 
population (e.g.  leafleting, web-based media, TV or radio, etc.).  The delivery of 
information is remote and one way.   
Media:  those organisations involved in preparing, presenting and broadcasting or 
otherwise disseminating written, audio-visual (TV and radio) and web-based 
communications.   
Opinion formers:  individuals who are influential in establishing, maintaining or 
challenging particular opinions and viewpoints on the event or activity.   
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1.2 Strategic Thinking on Engagement for CCS Deployment  
 
Communication and engagement around CCS has not moved as quickly as might be 
expected considering the scale of deployment envisaged by proponents (Reiner 2008; 
Ashworth et al 2009; Shackley et al 2009).  The fact that public knowledge is low will 
make it more difficult for each new project to achieve acceptance or support from 
local publics.  Discussion of, and familiarity with, CCS at national level would help 
local publics to understand the issues if a project is proposed in their own area.   
 
1.2.1 Levels 
 
Bodies delivering engagement to publics and stakeholders operate on many levels –
from international to local (Cash et al. 2006).  Some topics which are discussed during 
engagement strategies relate to higher or lower levels – climate change and national 
energy planning relate more to national or international issues, and may be better 
delivered by a national or international body.  In contrast, issues such as local 
environmental changes, construction, jobs and perceived risks are more local in 
nature, and may be better delivered by local level bodies – such as the developer of a 
project.  This type of level analysis may be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Project developers can and do deliver engagement at local level, and the Zero 
Emissions Platform (ZEP) is committed to engagement at European level, but there is 
a gap at regional and national level.  No group has yet taken it upon itself to engage 
the general public in the UK, although some groups have stated intentions to do so or 
are beginning to address this gap. Launched in March 2010, the Office of Carbon 
Capture and Storage states one their main goals is “raising levels of understanding 
about CCS within governments, industry and the public” (OCCS 2010). The Carbon 
Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) have begun initial work on communication 
at the national level. The Scottish government have conducted a stakeholder 
consultation informing the recently published roadmap (Scottish Government and 
Scottish Enterprise 2010), acknowledge that “governments will have a crucial role” 
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and advocate a coalition of government, NGOs, academia and industry to address 
public awareness issues. Promisingly, engagement activities are included in the 
Scottish Government roadmap; but a more proactive approach than has been stated 
will be necessary to achieve the goal of public acceptance. The UK Government 
conducted during 2009 a stakeholder consultation which received over 2250 
responses and has informed UK policy and plans for CCS development (DECC 
2009). The UK Government also states its intention to “Increase public awareness and 
stimulate an informed debate on the role of CCS in mitigating climate change” (HM 
Government 2010). It should be noted that stakeholder engagement does not 
necessarily lead to public acceptance and that stakeholder engagement and public 
engagement are distinct activities and should be treated as such. 
 
Discussion and debate regarding CCS at national level may help local projects 
through increasing public knowledge and understanding, but also in other ways too.  
Susan Owens (2004) points out that local disputes may become a substitute for a 
wider national dialogue in the absence of any opportunity to participate in that wider 
national debate.  Local disputes can become a forum for expressing frustration or 
discontent with wider issues.   
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Figure 1 Levels of various aspects relevant to CCS engagement, relevant to Scottish CCTS Development Study. 
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1.2.2 Interactions between levels 
 
Levels are not fixed, discrete units and there is much interaction between levels.  
Goals at one level may build upon goals achieved at other levels – for example the 
goal of nationwide CCS deployment would not be possible without individual 
projects going ahead; and appropriate high level support is required for individual 
projects to proceed (Wilson et al 2009).  Some harmonisation between actions on 
different levels is therefore desirable.  Figure 2 illustrates the concept of multi-level 
interaction, showing how various levels of engagement activities may build to 
influence one person. 
 
Some media – for example the internet – cut across levels, presenting local events 
globally or making global events locally relevant.  Cross level alliances are also 
possible, between opposition groups or advocates.  This type of alliance often 
strengthens the weight of argument and the staying power of the group.  An example 
would be national protest organisations with an anti-fossil fuel agenda joining up with 
local groups opposed on grounds of visual intrusion and local nuisance.   
 
 
Government sponsored 
citizen panels 
CCS in 
national media 
Developer 
led outreach 
Word of Mouth 
Figure 2 Nesting – the various levels of engagement occur ‘within each other’. 
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1.2.3 Timing  
 
National engagement – information delivery and debate – around CCS would ‘prepare 
the ground’ for individual projects to go ahead.  However national level engagement 
might be more effective once there are some CCS facilities operating in the UK, as it 
would then be clear what kind of thing was being discussed.  Striking a balance 
between these two positions would be helpful, and could be managed by using 
operating CCS projects in other countries as examples.   
 
Engagement activities have been under-discussed if discussed at all in roadmaps for 
CCS advancement.  Technical, economic, political and regulatory milestones have 
been published (e.g.  Gibbens & Chalmers 2008; Gough et al 2010, IEA 2009), but 
engagement strategies have generally not been included in these plans.  An example 
of a CCS deployment plan (Gibbins & Chalmers 2008; Figure 3) may be modified to 
show how a longer term plan for engagement might operate. 
 
Each tranche will need appropriate communication and engagement activities as well 
as technical and regulatory systems in place.  Local level engagement for a new 
facility will always be necessary, but will be greater for the earlier projects because 
they are new and relatively unknown by the public.  As more CCS facilities are 
constructed and national level engagement becomes stronger, awareness and 
understanding, and hopefully support, for CCS will grow, and be at a point to permit 
widespread deployment by 2020-2030.  Gibbins & Chalmers’ diagram can be 
modified accordingly (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3 A plan for CCS roll-out (Gibbins and Chalmers 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ongoing national 
engagement builds 
public knowledge 
Engagement for 
demonstration 
projects 
Engagement 
for second 
tranche 
Figure 4 A sketch of how engagement activities should build towards CCS roll-out.   
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2 Public Responses to CCS: Building Knowledge 
from Practice and Research 
2.1 Summary of CCS and Gas Infrastructure Case Studies  
 
As the development of CCS moves into the demonstration phase, the public is 
increasingly coming into contact with large projects.  The early large-scale projects – 
in particular Sleipner, In Salah, Weyburn-Midale and Rangley, went ahead without 
any public opposition.  This may have given rise to a false sense of security amongst 
developers in the early 2000s that there would be no public opposition to future 
projects.  While CCS advocates did mention the importance of public communication 
from time to time, there was little systematic activity in this area until recently (Reiner 
2008).  The acceptance of the early stage projects may have been a consequence of: 
an offshore location (Sleipner); the very low population densities in the storage areas 
(In Salah, Weyburn); and / or of the historical use of Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) 
(Weyburn, Rangley), such that CO2 storage was, in effect, a moderate addition to an 
existing practice.   
 
It came as something of a surprise, therefore, when public opposition to a number of 
high-profile CCS projects in Europe and the USA began to emerge in around 2008.   
Several high profile opposition movements have emerged, led by local public groups 
expressing concerns primarily about the safety of proposed projects.  In some cases 
these concerns have been addressed and local publics satisfied with the response, and 
in some cases local publics have not been satisfied, and projects have been halted, or 
delayed and gone ahead in reduced form against the wishes of local publics.  We 
review nine CCS cases, both controversial and not controversial; as well as four other 
infrastructure projects dealing with natural gas transport and storage.  Observations 
have been made upon factors leading to successful or not successful outcomes.  
Detailed case notes may be found in Appendix 1 and are briefly summarised in Table 
2.
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Case study, lead 
developer and 
project start date 
Project type Summary Engagement 
Activities 
Outcome – 
developer’s 
original goal 
Outcome – 
engagement 
process 
Barendrecht, 
Netherlands, Shell.  
Project announced 
2007. 
Demonstration  
onshore CCS 
from oil refinery 
resides to 
hydrogen 
gasification plant 
Local public opposition 
seriously impeded 
project 
Early engagement 
was not followed by 
satisfactory 
provision of 
information, which 
caused major 
problems.  Good 
engagement came 
later, but it was too 
late.   
In November 2010 
the  Dutch Ministery 
of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and 
Innovation 
announced the 
decision to cancel 
the project. The 
delay of the CO2 
storage project for 
more than 3 years 
and the complete 
lack of local support 
were given as the 
main reasons to 
stop. 
Very bad – 
strong local 
public and local 
political 
opposition, 
negative media 
coverage.   
Greenville, Ohio, 
USA, Batelle.  
Project announced 
2007 
Demonstration 
onshore CCS 
from bio-ethanol 
plant 
Local opposition stopped 
project 
Early engagement, 
information 
gathering, public 
presentations, 
regular informal 
meetings 
The project was 
cancelled before 
regulatory phase 
was completed 
Serious lack of 
trust in developer 
and regulators 
identified, but not 
overcome.  
Strong 
opposition. 
Schwarzepumpe, 
Germany, 
Demonstration 
onshore CCS, 
The oxyfuel and capture 
element had no 
Very little 
engagement.  This 
The full CCS chain 
could not be tested 
The little 
engagement was 
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Vattenfall.  
Construction began 
2007. 
oxyfuel. 
Storage site was 
not approved 
prior to capture 
project starting. 
opposition, but the 
capture site has been 
refused by local public. 
was fine in the high 
trust/well known 
technology location; 
but not in the low 
trust/unknown 
technology location. 
because of local 
popular and political 
opposition to 
storage. 
not satisfactory 
when dealing 
with a technology 
which is 
perceived as 
unfamiliar. 
Lacq, France, Total.  
Announced 2007, 
began operating 
2010. 
Demonstration 
onshore CCS, 
oxyfuel. 
Good engagement, good 
social fit, project went 
ahead as planned. 
Open and 
transparent early 
engagement 
campaign, took all 
concerns seriously 
and dealt with all 
issues. 
Project went ahead 
as planned, delayed 
by one year. 
Considerable 
local support, 
though some feel 
they could have 
been more 
involved.  Total 
have earned 
plenty of trust.   
Ketzin, Germany, 
German Research 
Centre for 
Geosciences (GFZ).  
The project started 
2004 and began 
injection 2008. 
CCS pilot, 
onshore, 
research led.  
Project went ahead as 
planned.  Good social fit. 
Early and 
comprehensive 
engagement.  That 
developers were 
scientists was 
important for trust. 
Project went ahead 
as planned 
Stakeholders 
satisfied with 
engagement. 
FutureGen, Illinois, 
USA, FutureGen 
Alliance.  The 
competition was 
announced 2003, 
2007 a winner was 
picked.   
Commercial 
CCS, onshore, 
hydrogen 
gasification. 
Communities competed 
to host this ‘next 
generation’ facility, and 
the $2bn it brought.  
Mattoon, Illinois won. 
Comprehensive 
early engagement 
in all sites, good 
information 
provision.  As 
communities were 
self selecting, good 
social fit was more 
The project was 
announced in 
Mattoon, to the 
celebrations of the 
township.  US 
Department of 
Energy then pulled 
funding which has 
Good 
engagement as 
well as self 
selection led to 
stakeholder 
support, but 
delays are 
undermining this. 
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likely. delayed the project. 
Weyburn-Midale, 
Canada, Petroleum 
Technology 
Research Centre 
(PTRC).  Launched 
2000. 
Demonstration 
and research 
CCS and EOR 
project.  CO 
from gasification 
facility. 
Running since 2000, 
long term data has been 
produced on CO 
behaviour and modelling. 
Very little 
information is 
available on 
engagement 
activities.  Very low 
population density 
and long history 
with oil and 
enhanced oil 
recovery (EOR)  
may account for 
this. 
The project is 
considered a 
success. 
There are no 
records of 
opposition to this 
project.  
Occasional 
positive 
statements in 
local press. 
Peterhead, 
Scotland, Scottish 
and Southern 
Energy, BP. 
Demonstration 
scale pre-
combustion 
hydrogen power 
station, with 
offshore EOR (at 
Miller field)  
The oil field  was being 
decommissioned and the 
project relied upon a  
government subsidy 
which did not happen.  
BP pulled out of the 
project and the Miller 
field is now being 
decommissioned.   
Early engagement 
at the pre-planning 
stage with council, 
local publics and 
interested parties 
were very positive, 
and media 
welcomed the 
project.   
The project was 
cancelled because 
of the lack of 
government subsidy 
to make it 
economically viable.  
Local authority 
and publics 
supported the 
project, as did 
high level 
politicians.  The 
loss of the 
project is a sore 
point for many. 
Carson, California, 
USA, BP.  Project 
announced 2006. 
Demonstration 
CCS onshore 
gasification and 
hydrogen power 
from petroleum 
coke with EOR. 
Initial use of oil field 
below a densely 
populated area for EOR 
was abandoned in favour 
of an oil field site in a 
more rural area (Kern 
County).  The official 
Extent of 
engagement 
strategy at Carson 
unknown, early and 
proactive in Kern 
county.  Social fit is 
better in Kern 
Although delayed 
by 3-4 years, the 
project is now in a 
location where it 
appears that it will 
go ahead. 
Perhaps due to 
the timely 
retraction of the 
project, 
opposition 
movements have 
now died away 
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reason given was 
complications over the 
ownership of the field, 
though a local campaign 
against the storage plans 
may also have been a 
factor.   
county. (unlike in 
Greenville, Ohio).  
Milford Haven – 
Gloucester pipeline.  
Project began 2003, 
completed 2008. 
120 km natural 
gas pipeline, 
from Liquified 
Natural Gas 
(LNG) terminals 
in Wales to end 
users in 
England. 
Marred by safety 
concerns over the LNG 
terminals, opposition in 
three sites evolved, and 
issue became a political 
football. 
Targeted and 
locally sensitive 
engagement was 
countered by the 
linking of national 
and local opposition 
groups, and 
modern safety risks 
with historical 
grudges. 
Delayed by a year, 
the pipeline was 
constructed. 
Many 
stakeholders 
were satisfied, 
and many were 
not.  One of the 
three opposition 
sites was 
resolved 
amicably. 
Rossport, Co.  
Mayo, Ireland, 
Shell.  Project 
announced 2000. 
90 km high 
pressure pipeline 
transporting gas 
from an offshore 
well to an 
onshore refinery. 
Unsatisfied by safety 
evaluation and failed by 
democratic means, local 
concerns evolved into 
entrenched opposition.   
Good quality 
engagement came 
too late, once 
opposition had 
become 
entrenched.   
Everything except 
the onshore pipeline 
has been built.  A 
completely new 
route is now being 
investigated.  The 
project is delayed 
by three years.   
The media 
coverage has 
been negative 
and sparked 
national debates 
in Ireland.  Since 
opposition 
began, the gap 
has never been 
broached. 
Gateway Gas 
Storage, Rampside 
Offshore gas 
storage in salt 
Open and thorough 
engagement strategy, 
Early engagement 
with stakeholders in 
The project 
received all 
Local publics and 
media were 
  
 
25 
Chesire, England, 
Stag Energy.  
Announced 2006, 
all permits obtained 
2010. 
caverns, with 
onshore 
compressor. 
good social fit at the 
beginning of a new 
phase of developments 
contributed to a 
successful project.   
pre-planning phase 
and public 
exhibitions 
stressing personal 
communication. 
necessary licences 
and permissions to 
begin construction 
in a timely fashion. 
supportive, but 
are beginning to 
grumble now a 
slew of other 
energy projects 
have been 
announced. 
Saltfleetby, 
Lincolnshire, UK, 
WinGas.  
Announced 2006. 
Onshore gas 
storage in a 
depleted gas 
field.   
Local opposition due to 
greenfield site, dis-
amenity and risk delayed 
project.  Attempt now to 
gain permission from 
central government 
Thorough 
engagement 
strategy including 
face to face 
meetings, public 
meetings and a 
citizens panel 
maintained cordial 
relations; but did 
not resolve dispute. 
The project has 
been delayed by 
three years. 
It seems that 
trust relations 
have endured, 
but the results of 
the engagement 
have not been 
used to modify 
the project 
proposal, and 
therefore the 
dispute has 
endured. 
Table 2 Summary of CCS and gas infrastructure case studies.
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2.2 Observations from case Studies 
 
The reasons why publics may oppose and block a project from going ahead cannot be 
readily deduced from a small number of case-studies and as such remain debatable.  It 
is difficult - if not impossible - to test hypotheses in a scientific manner.  Between the 
studies, however, patterns do emerge and the main observations are presented here.   
 
2.2.1 Stakeholders 
 
The most important stakeholders seem to be the local public, local public groups, and 
local politicians.  Where opposition has occurred, groups of local people, supported 
by local politicians, have been the most committed agents of that opposition, whether 
through democratic means (e.g. the planning process), legal means (e.g. court cases) 
or protests (e.g. marches).   
Local stakeholders may be supported in various ways by external groups and these are 
frequently the most effective campaigns.  For example, national level NGOs are able 
to provide advice, support and resources to local groups, and to publicise the cause in 
media circles not otherwise accessible to the local groups.  Intervention from higher 
level politicians can have great impact upon outcomes either way, and experts who 
oppose projects can be very influential in the media.  Often these non-local groups are 
concerned with non-local issues (such as climate change, or promoting sustainable 
energy), and there is a tendency for oppositional movements to embrace all the 
various concerns, building them into an argument against a project. 
 
2.2.2 Social Fit: Trust 
 
The level of public trust in developers is an important variable.  If trust get so low that 
publics or stakeholders do not believe the information they are presented with, it will 
be impossible to have constructive dialogue Although high trust levels may give 
developers more leeway, they are not a substitute for dealing with substantive 
concerns which may be raised. 
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Where a historical relationship has been built up with a company trust may be high, 
but often companies are perceived as having more interest in profit than in the public 
good.  Scientists are perceived as pursuing knowledge rather than profit, and therefore 
more likely to align their practice with the pubic good.  Depending on local 
conditions, governmental or political actors may or may not be perceived as acting in 
the best interests of the locals.  In some cases, national government is not trusted, but 
local government is trusted.  Locally-based, or national level non-governmental 
organisations also tend to be trusted more highly as they are perceived to have nothing 
to gain from misleading the public.  Projects which have been led by research 
organisations, or have been supported by trusted independent parties have tended also 
to benefit from greater perceived credibility. 
 
2.2.3 Social Fit: History 
 
In all of the successful CCS examples analysed, there was a history of extractive and 
fossil fuels industry in the area, predisposing local acceptance.  In the cases where 
opposition occurred, the fossil fuel industry was generally new, and did not have a 
good long term relationship with local stakeholders.  The history of a location can 
predispose people either for or against a project. 
 
A good example of this is from Germany, where various storage facilities in the state 
of Brandenburg have been opposed, and one – Ketzin – has been successful.  Ketzin is 
located in an area which relied heavily upon gas storage for the local economy, which 
is now coming to an end.  The other sites in Brandenberg by contrast are picturesque 
medieval market towns, relying on tourism for the local economy.  The Milford 
Haven gas pipeline is perhaps a counter example, as the gas pipeline was not 
welcomed despite a history of coal mining; but a host of other factors combined to 
result in opposition. 
 
Population density is also a factor – all the successful projects have occurred outside 
of cities.  The two cases which attempted projects in high density areas (Carson and 
Barendrecht) met with greater of opposition.  Groups in Greenville, Ohio took offence 
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to the idea that CCS projects should go ahead in less densely populated areas, 
understanding it to mean that rural lives are less valuable than urban lives.  This is of 
course not the case; the issue is that when there are less people, there is less likelihood 
of opposition snowballing and there are less people to engage with, making the task 
easier and more manageable.  Where there are fewer landowners it may be an easier 
task to convince them to sell necessary land.  This could be a particular concern for 
pipeline transport. 
 
2.2.4 Anticipation and Early Engagement 
 
Early engagement and preparedness seem to be hallmarks of a good engagement 
strategy.  Early, informal engagement conducted face-to-face or in a friendly and 
personal way serves both to build trusting relationships and to gather information on 
local concerns and preferences, allowing a more widespread engagement strategy to 
be tailored to the local context.  Some concerns expressed may seem to the developer 
to be irrelevant to the project: but they are still valid in the minds of those who 
expressed them and should be dealt with. 
 
Public meetings conducted without sufficient anticipation of public concerns can 
backfire.  If questions are asked which cannot be answered, or if evidence is requested 
which cannot be delivered within an acceptable timeframe, this can be taken as 
evidence of risks, or that the developer is hiding something.  A good strategy seems to 
be to expect that all questions that could be asked will be asked. 
 
2.2.5 Meaningful Engagement 
 
A good engagement strategy builds trust relations with and between the developer and 
the stakeholders, and it provides information about local preferences.  Depending on 
the ‘decision making style’ adopted by the developer, local preferences can be used to 
influence further project design or project re-visioning.  In the case of Saltfleetby, the 
engagement strategy has maintained relations between the developer and 
stakeholders, but had not resolved the dispute, because the local concerns had not 
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translated into sufficient alterations of the project.  Of course the developer may have 
valid counter arguments for why this has not been done, but they must be presented 
clearly and honestly to convince opponents.  This case shows that a good engagement 
strategy alone is not enough to compensate for an unpopular project – although it can 
point towards what a popular project might be. 
 
2.2.6 Managing expectations 
 
Stakeholders in different contexts expect different levels of input into decisions which 
affect them.  Those engagement strategies which have been clear from the start about 
how much influence stakeholders (including the public) can have and what they 
should expect from the process appear to have been more successful.  The best 
example of this is the Lacq case, where the developer published a ‘consultation 
charter’ in which they “guarantee a meaningful dialogue with all stakeholders” and 
lay out the actions they intend to take. 
 
Matching the expectations of stakeholders to the engagement and decision making 
process can lead to satisfactory outcomes for all, even if the engagement process is 
weak.  In Germany, the central government makes decisions effecting national energy 
policy, and often local authorities are informed only late in the process 
 
Local publics are generally informed by media, and not by industry sponsored 
engagement.  Where trust is high and the development is not perceived as risky 
technology (e.g.  the capture element in Schwarze Pumpe), stakeholders are generally 
satisfied with this outcome.  When expectations are mismatched however, the greatest 
opposition can erupt.  In Barendrecht the general public for the most part stayed out of 
the debate; but when the decision against the development was overturned by the 
national government, local publics felt their democratic rights had been infringed and 
attended by far the biggest and most outspoken expression of anger during the whole 
process.  This contributed to the eventual cancellation of the project.  The gas pipeline 
in Rossport in Ireland is an example of how far people will go if they feel their rights 
have not been respected; some people have been prepared to defy the law and serve a 
prison sentence.   
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2.2.7 Honesty and Transparency 
 
If the developer and the information they provide are perceived as being dishonest, it 
will not be accepted.  Once trust has been lost and the developer has gained a bad 
reputation, even high quality, independent, scientific information and engagement 
tends to be viewed as biased propaganda if it supports the developer’s standpoint.  
This is a dilemma, because if the developer does not provide evidence to support their 
project, they risk criticism and if they do provide evidence they are accused of 
presenting false and biased evidence.  This was particularly notable in Barendrecht 
and Rossport, and in Greenville on the topic of water contamination. 
The best way to guard against this is by early, well prepared and high quality 
engagement, with support from independent and trusted third parties.  Willingness to 
answer all questions, proactive engagement with all stakeholders and the ability to 
provide evidence quickly are all important.  Timeliness is of utmost importance, as 
delays can be perceived as evidence of nefarious behaviour or of a lack of concern or 
interest in what the public and opponents think about a proposed development.   
 
Transparency of process can be useful: explaining what decisions have been made, 
and what alternatives were assessed; as well as involving senior decision makers from 
the project developer in the public processes; and making it clear how stakeholder 
input will be used.  Lacq or Ketzin are good examples of a transparent process.   
 
2.2.8 Public Concerns 
Public concerns are addressed more thoroughly in section 2.3 summarising the 
findings from research.  From observation of the cases studied, it seems clear that the 
primary local concern is of safety and risk to personal health, homes and land value.  
Secondary to this issue are other supporting arguments against CCS which can be 
taken up, bolstering opposition: doubts over efficacy to combat climate change, 
especially when compared to other sustainable energy options; responsibility for long 
term liability; decreased plant efficiency, implying higher costs and more fossil fuel 
extraction and combustion; perpetuation of the fossil fuel industry.   
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On the positive side, there are various locally perceived benefits to CCS projects, 
most notably those that extend or improve the local economy.  This is particularly 
relevant in areas which have relied upon fossil fuel industries for employment, and 
where the long term future of this is in doubt.  Cutting edge projects and technology 
development in the local area can be a source of pride, and industry sponsored 
benefits such as community development funds may improve stakeholder perceptions, 
although there is little evidence of this.  At present, the strongest evidence we have 
that communities can perceive CCS to be highly positive arises from the FutureGen 
project in the USA.  The large amounts of public and private-sector investment in that 
project, meaning 1000 new jobs, and the proximity to coal fields,  may help explain 
the strongly positive associations of the local community with the FutureGen project.  
These conditions are less likely to occur in the UK.   
 
2.2.9 Geological and Physical Fit 
 
The question ‘Why is it here?’ often remains unanswered, despite the efforts of 
developers to explain the technical and logistical reasons.  Opponents are quick to 
claim they are being taken advantage of by a mistrusted party – usually the developer 
or the national government – and cite this as the real reason for the project location.  
Better explanation of why one location was chosen over others (including social 
factors), and what other options were assessed, may help to alleviate this problem.  It 
does not look good when a failed project relocates to another location – there is a 
tendency for opposition to follow.  (This may be occurring in Indiana, where there 
have been press reports that Battelle is seeking a substitute for Greenville, Ohio, in 
Randolph County, provoking public opposition even before any official 
announcement).  The FutureGen approach of launching a competition to host the 
project worked well; with communities self selecting and actively wanting the project, 
rather than feeling it may have been imposed upon them.   
 
The geological and physical viability of injection sites is of primary concern to 
developers, and much attention is paid to ensuring that CO does not escape.  Local 
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groups are interested in this too, but may be interested in other factors which 
developers do not consider likely enough to warrant investigation; such as 
earthquakes, landslides or contamination of drinking water and a resulting loss in 
property value.  A wider assessment of geological and physical characteristics may be 
helpful in guarding against these types of concerns early on. 
 
2.2.10 Storage is the most contentious element 
 
The capture element of the process seems to be so far perceived as no more than a 
novel extension of existing technology.  However, any changes to what previously 
occurred on the site should be considered in the same way as for any other project – 
visual appearance, noise, nuisance, any new hazardous or explosive chemicals, are all 
of interest to local publics. 
 
Storage is however perceived as something new, unknown and potentially risky.  
Onshore storage is much more contentious than offshore, because of the proximity to 
people and their livelihoods; indeed, no offshore storage projects have been opposed 
as yet. 
 
There is little evidence about public reactions to using depleted gas or oil fields, as 
opposed to saline aquifers, although the economic opportunities of EOR and using a 
depleted gas or oil field for a new industry are attractive and probably help explain the 
acceptance of several projects (e.g.  Rangley and Weyburn).   
 
There have not been any reports of concerns over CO transport; opposition has 
tended to be focused at the storage site.  However, judging by the natural gas 
analogues, CO has the potential become controversial, whether transported by 
pipeline or ship.  The LNG terminals in Milford Haven and the proposed onshore 
pipeline route in Rossport attracted particular opposition, because of the proximity to 
housing and the perceived safety risks.  If carbon storage gets a bad reputation then 
this could well rub off to the transport element of the supply chain.  Pipelines, because 
of their lengthy nature, offer more sites and opportunities for opposition. 
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2.2.11 Background Knowledge 
 
Research has shown that an understanding of climate change, energy planning and the 
carbon cycle are all essential to understanding the motivation for carbon capture and 
storage.  This was borne out in Greenville where many stakeholders including the 
local media and public samples consulted were extremely sceptical of climate change 
science; and in Barendrecht where the project developer assumed too much 
knowledge about national energy planning options. 
 
2.2.12 Political Football 
 
Like many high profile issues, there is a risk that CCS projects become political 
footballs, which politicians support or oppose in order to gain popularity.  In 
Beeskow, Germany, local elections were coming up around the time of explorations 
for sequestration sites, and it became popular to oppose the project.  All party 
representatives then opposed the project regardless of their party position, as to not 
have opposed it would have given the other parties an advantage.   
 
Particularly relevant is the relationship between the separate nations which constitute 
the United Kingdom.  During the Milford Haven pipeline case, a narrative of Welsh 
subjugation by the English emerged, and the Welsh National Assembly intervened 
with recently won powers to influence events.  Following the loss of the Peterhead 
project, the Scottish First Minister criticised the UK government for acting too slowly.  
These old tensions and battles for power may affect support or opposition to CCS 
projects. 
 
Whilst political involvement is essential for CCS development, perhaps particularly 
sensitive times such as elections could be avoided, or at least cross-party support 
sought early on. 
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2.2.13 Amplification 
 
Perceived risks, fears or evidence of untrustworthy activities can become amplified by 
the effect of the media, the internet and by word of mouth communication.  This is 
why early impressions and speedy responses are important.  ‘Experts’ who oppose or 
criticise the technical or safety aspects of a project can receive high coverage, even if 
their opinions are not held by the majority; in a similar way credible crusaders against 
a project (e.g.  local politicians) may reach a large audience, even if their statements 
are contrary to technically derived risk assessments.   
 
Positive issues may be amplified by the same means, and as such engagement with the 
media, opinion formers and publics can help to build positive opinions regarding a 
proposed project. 
 
2.2.14 Outreach Materials 
 
Experience with the materials used to explain to publics has shown that: 3D models 
are particularly useful; that diagrams should be approximately to scale especially 
when conveying the depth of geological storage sites; and that maps showing housing 
and storage sites encourage worries of leaks.  Printed media and internet sites were 
very commonly used, as were presentations, and some degree of face to face 
communication and opportunity for question asking.  Most cases do not provide 
enough detail to assess the utility of these methods.  A sample of some of the best 
outreach materials are listed in Table 12.
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2.3 Research: Findings and Theory  
2.3.1 Review of Past Literature on Perceptions of CCS 
 
We briefly review evidence on public perceptions of CCS.  Studies have been 
undertaken in the USA, Australia, Japan, Netherlands, UK, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Switzerland; references are available at the end of the document. Studies 
can be distinguished in terms of the research method(s) used and the purpose or 
underlying rationale of the study.  Methods include surveys and questionnaires, 
interviews, workshops, focus groups and citizen groups; the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each research method are summarised in Table 10.  In terms of 
purpose, we can distinguish between: a) basic or pure research – where the aim is to 
further academic knowledge and understanding; and b) applied research – where the 
aim is to apply research concepts and tools to ‘real world’ situations with the intention 
of having some impact.  The use of methods is likely to change as we move from 
basic to applied research, for example, from more passive methods such as surveys to 
more active methods such as citizen groups.   
 
We also distinguish between basic research aiming to anticipate perceptions and 
reactions (anticipative basic research) and research understanding reactions to a 
proposed or actual development (which has been covered in the section on the 
experience of several CCS projects).  There is not much research on reactions to CCS 
experiences 1, due to the recent nature of occurrences of opposition movements to 
CCS projects (which really only began in 2008).   
 
Common public perceptions found during basic research and applied research  are 
summarised in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
                                                 
1 NearCO - an EU project - has published a very useful case study analysis (Desbarats et al 2009) 
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Issue  Notes  Examples / 
references  
Large-scale leakage 
of CO2 from 
geological storage 
sites  
Concerns about safety of storage – lack of understanding of how liquids or 
supercritical fluids occur in rock formations.   
Concerns over explosive  release of pressurised CO2  ‘bubble’ or ‘balloon’  
Defeats the purpose of CCS  
Health and safety risks arising to local populations  
Ecological impacts of leakage  
Induced seismicity / earthquakes  
Onshore storage sites viewed less favourably because of risks of leakage and 
induced seismicity 
Impacts on ground water  
Leakage of CO2 from 
pipelines  and low-
level leakage from 
storage sites  
 
Risk of explosions  
Health and safety risks  
Local ecological impacts of leakage on plants, animals and ecosystems  
Avoids tackling ‘real 
issue’ of moving 
towards a genuinely 
sustainable future 
energy system  
Short termism   
End-of-pipe technology: better to reduce emissions that to store  
Allows unsustainable use of fossil fuels to continue into the future  
Allows us ‘off the hook’   
 Could deter investment in, and policy attention directed towards, renewable energy 
development  
Could deter action on energy efficiency and reducing energy demand  
Green light to other underground storage of other waste streams  
Could it result in a larger rebound effect?   
Feasibility & Costs  Expensive  
Who is going to pay?   
Palmgren et al. 
(2004) 
 
Shackley et al.  
(2005)  
 
Wallquist et al.  
(2009)  
 
Huijts (2003 ; 
2007) 
 
Gough et al.  
(2002)  
  
Oltra et al. 
(undated) 
 
Sharp (2008 a & b)  
 
Terwel et al 
(2009a) 
 
Ashworth et al.  
(2007)  
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Not tested / technology not ready yet  
Is there enough storage capacity?   
Requires a massive infrastructure which does not exist today  
A use for CO2?   Is there any way that CO2 can be utilised such that it comes to have a value?   
Preference for making use of something that costs a lot of money to remove  
Trust and Confidence  Industry shouldn’t be allowed to profit from this  
Motivations of industry and politicians involved are not trusted 
Where arguments promoted by industry are felt to be incongruent with that 
organisation’s motives, trust decreased   
Range of view about trustworthiness of companies, governments, NGOs and 
scientists  
Liability / responsibility:  who is responsible, especially in the long-term?   
Strategic Issues  
 
 
 
CCS as a ‘bridging mechanism’ while other low-C technologies developed  
Relies on government subsidies  
There are better options for carbon reduction than CCS  
Moral issues  Are we ‘playing God’?   
Table 3 Findings from anticipative basic research (i.e.  undertaken without reference to a particular real-world case) 
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Issue  Notes  Examples / 
references  
Local benefits  Importance of direct economic or other types of benefit to the local 
community – e.g.  job creation, money into the area, prestige,  advanced 
technology development, centre of excellence, a visitor centre promoting 
local tourism, etc.   
Maintaining  core industries and skills and allowing continued use of 
resources such as coal  
Potential use of CO2 in local industries or in Enhanced Oil Recovery, etc.   
Energy diversification?   
Local Issues and possible 
concerns  
Impacts on water consumption / availability  
Production of saline water  
Costs of power  
Area disturbances  - end up living in an industrial park  
Land-use rights  
Decommissioning  
Monitoring  
Property rights  Appropriate compensation packages  
Neighboring farmers / landowners  wanting compensation for CO2 storage 
and possible loss of mineral rights  
Property prices effected?   
Negative experience in the past, e.g.  with pipelines adversely affecting 
agricultural land  
Role of information 
provision  
 
 
Some evidence that concerns over CCS are positively correlated with 
understanding  
In one case, respondents’ had general concerns about CCS which became 
better articulated as more information was received 
In one case, respondents  support for CCS did increase over a one day 
FutureGen work in the 
USA  
 
Hund & Judd, (2008)  
 
Bielicki & Stephens 
(2008)  
 
Bradbury et al.  (2009)  
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seminar, but only as part of a portfolio of approaches  
Physical models of CCS helped to increase understanding  
Local media positive about job creation and ability to sustain coal industry  
Deficiency of expert information  
Stakeholder Engagement  Active engagement with a range of local and regional stakeholders, opinion-
formers and community-leaders appears to have helped in building local 
acceptance of projects  
Trust and Fairness  Lack of trust in government and the private sector  
Poor experience of oil and gas sectors in the past  
Desire for transparency, participation and redress should something go 
wrong  
Sense of empowerment would increase acceptability (empowerment being 
defined as ability to mitigate community-defined risks and to ensure that just 
procedures would be adopted) 
Concern that CCS plants will be dumped in poor and voiceless communities  
The key risk could be that of being neglected and ignored in the event of 
project failure  
Fear of being in a ‘sacrifice zone’ and being treated as ‘guinea pigs’  
Lack of confidence in monitoring regime and lack of clarity on who would 
listen to concerns  
Table 4 Key Public Concerns regarding CCS Arising from Applied Research (surveys, focus groups, etc.)  (i.e.  undertaken in the context of a real-
world proposed project) 
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2.3.1.1 Findings from Basic Research  
2.3.1.1.1 Anticipative Basic Research  
An important point from surveys is that there is a very low level of knowledge or 
awareness of CCS technologies (e.g.  Curry et al.  2005).  This is hardly surprising 
since there is no particular reason why the public should know about CCS.  Opinions 
ascertained from surveys have to be treated cautiously – they are frequently unstable 
and can change rapidly in response to a change in information, context or for no 
apparent reason (Daamen et al.  2006, de Best-Waldhober et al.  2009).  There is 
general agreement amongst experts that opinions collected in surveys based upon 
cursory and technical accounts of CCS do not reflect likely perceptions when faced 
with the prospects of actual deployment (Malone et al 2009; Malone et al 2010).   
 
The response to CCS has been shown to be ‘lukewarm’, not a strong acceptance.  
Methods such as focus groups, citizen panels, information-choice questionnaire (ICQ) 
testing and theoretical psychometric modelling, have tended to give a somewhat more 
(though largely not strongly) positive portrayal of CCS than have surveys.  This is, 
again, not that surprising since more active methods provide an opportunity for 
providing information on what is, initially, a largely unknown entity.   
 
The reaction of survey respondents to more information about CCS has been 
somewhat mixed, with some studies indicating a move towards more positive 
opinions, while others have indicated more negative reactions.  The quality of 
information provided clearly matters and provision of accurate, balanced and 
understandable information appears to lead to more stable opinions (de Best-
Waldhober et al., 2009).  Providing information and perspectives from a range of 
stakeholders in the conduct of in-depth discussion groups or focus groups allows 
respondents to develop an informed opinion, and usually increase support (Roberts 
and Mander 2010; Shackley et al.  2005).   
 
While increasing the amount of information available to respondents produces results 
that are less likely to be representative more widely, deeper engagement has been 
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shown to change public perceptions of CCS, sometimes drastically.  In a group 
process, it is difficult to know, however, the extent to which the change in perceptions 
is due to the information provided per se, or to the social relationships which emerge 
between the participants and the expert or stakeholder speakers presenting to them.  
An external speaker may become a ‘trusted informant’ and develop a good 
relationship with the participants and this could be highly important in influencing 
how the information presented is perceived, may be more important the actual 
information itself!  It is also important to note that there is rarely complete unanimity 
within in-depth discussion group: typically several different ‘factions’ can be 
identified during the course of debate (Shackley et al., 2005).   
 
Assessment of CCS in focus and citizen groups may also have been influenced by 
presentation of the local benefits (jobs, technology centres, prestige, central 
government funding, etc.) and by comparison with other stigmatized technologies, 
especially nuclear power (but also, possibly,  large-scale renewables).  Organisers and 
facilitators of groups have considerable flexibility in how they present CCS – for 
example, as an ‘answer to the problem of climate change whilst protecting energy 
security’, or alternatively, as ‘introducing inefficiency while perpetuating the 
unsustainable use of fossil fuels’.  It is frequently hard from reading reports and 
papers to ascertain exactly how framing of the issue has been undertaken and whether 
this might have introduced bias.   
 
2.3.1.2 Findings from Applied Research  
 
A focus upon the context of potential or actual projects in applied research has 
allowed studies to become more nuanced and to reveal context-specific factors.  It 
appears possible that the same group of citizens could readily respond quite 
differently to the idea of CCS ‘in principle’ and the proposal to construct a plant in a 
specific place and time, CCS ‘in reality’.   
 
Examples of applied research are the US regional partnerships, where small-scale 
drilling and CO2 storage pilot studies have been undertaken, each of which has 
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involved work on stakeholder and public perceptions, and the Futuregen project in the 
USA.  Indeed the inclusion of public and stakeholder engagement and communication 
as one of the primary goals of the US Regional Carbon Sequestration Program 
(RCSP) has resulted in some very useful outcomes.  The seven individual regional 
efforts under RCSP, plus the FutureGen engagement process, has allowed a range of 
different methods and techniques to be trialled, compared and evaluated.  Nothing on 
this scale has happened in the EU and a more pro-active and systematic work 
programme on engagement in Europe could yield enormous benefits.  (This was one 
of the clear conclusions of the IEA GHG Social Issues Group meeting in Paris, 
November 2009).   
 
Concerns expressed in applied research tended to be (understandably) more grounded 
and focused on the location of the project and its potential local impacts, be they 
environmental, socio-economic or political.  Several of the US studies suggest that 
some communities (or parts thereof) perceive CCS projects as economic 
opportunities, whilst others focus upon the unfair distribution of hazards.  Where a 
public sample can engage with the practical aspects and issues arising from a project, 
they are likely to do so rather than to evaluate CCS as an abstraction dealing with an 
abstract problem (climate change).   
 
Such work also illuminates the point that the public is not a single entity, but 
encompasses multiple subgroups or 'publics' divided across lines of geography, 
income, education, health issues, historical interactions with industry and public 
institutions, and culture; and subject to influence and persuasion by multiple 
stakeholders and interested parties.   
 
Some studies have noted a significant public attention to socio-economic and political 
concerns entirely unanticipated by researchers prior to the study.  In one study, a set 
of issues around perceptions of fairness, equity, compensation, and redress in the face 
of unanticipated hazards far outweighed technical and scientific concerns specific to 
CCS technology (Bradbury et.al.  2009).  These results are underpinned by research 
from the field of social and environmental justice scholarship, which shows that 
people generally respond more positively to issues when they deem that they have 
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been treated fairly.  When people deal with authorities that they have had little contact 
with, the importance of fairness is not diminished, but opinions are driven by the 
degree of trust in the institution to compensate for the lack of direct interaction.  
Likewise, in the absence of detailed knowledge and understanding of technical and 
scientific concepts, the lay public frequently assesses the issue at hand by assessing 
the trustworthiness of the institutions which are involved in the evaluation process.  
Incorporating measures in the risk communication process which reassure people that 
their voices matter and that they will be treated fairly, may therefore yield increased 
public support for CCS.   
 
A limitation of the current applied research findings is that they are nearly all 
exclusively obtained from research underway in the USA.  We do not currently know 
the extent to which the findings may be culturally-specific to the USA context.   
 
2.3.2 Concepts useful to understand public responses to CCS 
 
2.3.2.1 Trust, Fairness and Accountability  
 
Advocates of technocratic decision-making maintain that the public (and other 
stakeholders) take decisions on a mostly technical basis.  As discussed in the section 
on decision-making, it is now more widely accepted that technical discourse is only 
an (often small) part of a real-world decision-making process.  At least as important 
are the relationships that exist between the proponent, developer or government 
agency / regulator, and the individuals or communities (Roberts and Mander 2010; 
Bradbury et al 2009; Terwel et al 2009b).  Trust, fairness and accountability should 
things go wrong are all important, connected variables.   
 
 
For a decision-making process to be perceived as fair, participants must understand 
the process for taking part, and the basis on which their participation will be used in 
the making of the decision.  Accountability deals with questions such as ‘Who will be 
there if things go wrong?’  ‘Who is accountable when the developer had moved 
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elsewhere?’  ‘How capable is the government or developer of undertaking CCS in a 
way that protects human health and the environment?’  Trust is arrived at through a 
history of ‘good behaviour’ which includes honesty and putting the public interest 
before those of profit; as well as perceptions of fairness and accountability.  Trust also 
contributes to these and other factors, most notably the credibility of information and 
evidence provided by the proponent. 
 
Some people might not engage in detail with the technical credibility of a project, but 
put trust in either the accountability or the competence of those who are operating a 
project (Bielicki & Stephens 2008). However good relations between proponents and 
publics are not a substitute for thoroughly designed and robust risk assessments: 
substantive issues are always questioned and failure to respond adequately can 
undermine projects, losing all the social capital that a developer has built.  
 
2.3.2.2 Nimby-ism, Place Identity and Place Attachment  
 
In some ways CCS is a ‘classic’ environmental technology in that the benefits are 
widely distributed (globally for CO2 abatement) but the costs in terms of risks can be 
perceived as being concentrated – namely by those who live close to the development.  
This is a common way in which individuals and communities respond to new 
technologies and infrastructure (often termed ‘not in my back yard’ - NIMBY) and it 
is a reasonable assumption that they will turn to this ‘frame of reference’ for CCS, at 
least initially.  NIMBY-type explanation tends to be used pejoratively to refer to 
people who are regarded as trying to stop a development for purely selfish motives, 
with no regard for the ‘greater good’. 
 
The use of NIMBY explanations has been criticized by writers such as Patrick 
Devine-Wright (2009) who have attempted to explain instead why people and 
communities have such strong opinions about proposed developments.  They have 
drawn upon ideas from environmental psychology such as ‘place identity’ (the extent 
to which a particular place is important in the construction of personal identity) and 
‘place attachment’ (the extent to which an individual or community feels a strong 
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sense of attachment to a particular place).  Where strongly positive place attachment 
occurs, resistance to a development that is perceived to threaten that place is likely to 
be high.  Hence, if a new industrial-type development is planned in a rural area, to 
which there is a high place attachment, some resistance could be anticipated.  Strong 
place identity can also result in resistance to change, even from people who do not 
live there.  An example relevant to Scotland would be the Beauly-Deny power lines or 
the proposed Lewis wind farm project: both fairly remote areas which are iconic to 
many of ‘Scotland’. 
It is worth noting that while one or two projects may be accepted, development 
fatigue may set in and a third or fourth project considered to be one too many.  If a 
community feels they have borne an unfair proportion of recent developments, there 
may come a point at which opposition emerges, even if it was not evident initially. 
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2.4 Conclusions from Case Studies and Research 
 
From the above research, we have identified five major topics upon which to engage 
the public (Figure 5).  Not every person will require an answer to every question in 
order to form their opinion on CCS, but it is likely that all questions will be asked.  
Every step of the pyramid may not be necessary, but they will all contribute to 
acceptance or support for a project.  Some topics may be better delivered by groups 
other than project developers operating at the local scale; but if they have not been 
done it may still benefit the developer to deliver engagement on those topics. 
 
 
What?  Basic knowledge of CCS – what it is, what it does and why 
Where?  Social Fit: History, Place 
Identity, Development Fatigue & the 
Local Economy 
How?  Project 
Details: Benefits, 
Risks & Nuisances 
Why?  Understanding of Climate Change & Options for Energy Generation 
Who?  Trust in Developer, Government etc.  to 
deliver a safe project and trust that fair redress will 
be available if necessary. 
Figure 5 Steps towards public support and acceptability. 
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3 Tools for Designing and Implementing an 
Engagement Strategy 
 
3.1 Approaches to Engagement 
Arnstein’s ‘participation ladder’ is a classic way of describing and presenting degrees 
of participation.  An adapted and expanded version is presented here as Table 5.   
The key point of Arnstein’s argument was that many practices that organizations 
describe as ‘participation’ actually treat the subject receiving the information as 
passive and do not respond to the input offered.  She therefore distinguished between 
active and passive forms.   
 
Number Name  Description 
1 Manipulation Public involvement is focused upon trying to 
cajole the public into supporting a project   
2 Therapy  Reassuring the public about a project  
3 Informing  Provision of information on request  
4 Consultation  Pro-active provision of information and response 
to questions  
5 Placation / 
compensation  
Engaging in face-to-face public consultation, but 
only in response to conflict, controversy, etc.   
6 Partnership I  Open to suggestions from members of 
communities / stakeholders who are met 
individually or in a group 
7 Partnership II   Designs shaped / influenced by members of 
communities / stakeholders who are met 
individually or in a group (discrete process)  
8 Partnership III  On-going process of influence by members of 
communities / stakeholders who are met 
individually or in a group  
9  Veto powers  Local community is given veto powers over plant 
design, operation, etc.   
Table 5 The Participation Ladder:  Adapted and expanded from Arnstein, S.  (1969)  
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3.1.1 Different Decision-Making Styles and the Role of Expertise  
 
There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers with respect to what a proponent or developer 
should do vis-à-vis communication and engagement, but some approaches may be 
more likely to lead to public opposition than others.  If no opportunity for public input 
is available, publics may oppose a project which could otherwise have been modified 
to satisfy both publics and the developer.  Generally, the more public involvement and 
the greater transparency of process, the less is the risk of show-stopping opposition 
(Heiskenan 2008).  The trade off is in the developer releasing some control over the 
project, the possibility of a slower and more expensive process, and ultimately the risk 
that publics preferences may alter the project so as to make it untenable.  For these 
reasons it is important to give clear messages on the degree of public involvement and 
reasons why certain options cannot be taken. 
 
It all depends upon the developer’s objectives, values as an organisation and upon 
their explicit or implicit notion of how decisions are most effectively taken and 
implemented.  For example, if a developer regards the public as largely ‘passive’ and 
believes the public is inclined to trust provided information, a very different 
communication / engagement strategy is implied than if the public is regarded as 
active and inclined to distrust received information.  Before working out what type of 
communication or engagement should be undertaken, therefore, it is first necessary to 
demarcate different approaches to decision making, which sit on a spectrum from the 
technocratic to the deliberative.  These explicit or implicit ‘models of policy making’ 
and associated expectations can have a major influence on the design of an 
engagement strategy – and can help to explain why strategies sometimes fail to live 
up to expectations.  While the same types of methods are frequently used across 
different decision-making styles, the use to which those methods (and the resultant 
findings) are put frequently varies.   
 
There is a long tradition in western societies of expert-led decision making, which is 
called ‘technocracy’.  In the technocratic model, ‘the politician becomes fully 
dependent on the expert.  Politics is replaced by a scientifically rationalised 
administration’ (Weingart 1999:154).  Or as van Zwanenberg & Millstone (2005: 14) 
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put it: ‘The assumption of technocracy, that scientific and technical considerations are 
not just necessary but also sufficient for policy decision-making, implies that policy-
making can and should be delegated to scientific and technical experts, because they 
and they alone are in possession of the relevant facts’.   
 
A referendum, in which decisions are taken by a vote of the populace, could be seen 
as being located at the other end of the decision-making spectrum.  Irrespective of the 
knowledge base or scientific training of the populace, the decision is taken by a 
popular vote.  This is the ultimate expression of ‘deliberative democracy’.  In between 
technocracy and fully deliberative democracy lie a large number of potential 
approaches.  Some of these are mapped out in Table 6.  The theory behind these ideas 
is explained in Held (1987).  We provide short examples of each of the five 
approaches identified.   
 
Fully 
deliberative  
Deliberative 
processes 
inform 
decisions   
Combination 
of expert 
input and 
deliberative 
processes  
Expert-led 
decision-
making 
Fully 
technocratic  
Referendum 
& ballots   
Citizen Juries 
– where 
decision is 
taken as final   
Citizen Juries, 
where 
decision only 
an input to 
decision   
Public may 
be 
consulted  
Experts 
decide  
 Planning Cells 
and Focus 
groups – 
inform design 
of policies and 
plans  
Focus groups, 
indepth 
discussion 
groups / 
citizen 
panels– inform 
decisions  
Focus 
groups – 
intelligence  
Focus 
groups – 
intelligence  
Examples of each approach 
Switzerland 
has a tradition 
of using 
ballots in 
decision-
making   
Initiative 
reform in 
Oregon  
 
 
Nano-Jury UK  
Genetically 
Modified 
(GM)-Jury UK  
GM Nation  
 
 
Southwood 
Working 
Party on 
BSE.  
French 
energy 
planning 
(traditionally).  
Table 6 Different styles of decisions making. 
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3.1.1.1 Fully deliberative 
 
One of the best examples of fully deliberative decision-making is to be found in 
Switzerland, where there is a strong tradition of using referenda for making important 
decisions.  Referenda are much more rarely used in most other countries due to the 
expense and time implications and to stronger traditions of technocracy.  It should be 
noted that a referendum when the voters are poorly or mis-informed is only a 
superficial form of deliberation. 
 
3.1.1.2 Deliberative processes inform decisions   
 
Here we include deliberative processes which have some legislative foundation or 
backing.  An example is the following.   
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In the Oregon example, the citizen’s panel does not have any statutory force, but its 
decisions are to be included in official information disseminated by the legislative 
authority.  Also included in this category would be examples where the Citizen’s 
Juries, also called Planning Cells in Germany, have had statutory influence, e.g.  in 
decision over siting of waste facilities.   
 
3.1.1.3 Combination of expert input and deliberative processes 
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In this case, a Citizen’s Jury or Panel or Planning Cell or some other types of 
processes (an in-depth workshop or a town meeting, etc.) would be used as one input 
to decision-making.  There is no statutory constraint on how a decision would be 
taken or what types of expert input would be required.  That is left to the discretion of 
the conventional decision-makers: the legislators (elected politicians), taking advice 
from a range of stakeholders and interest groups.  Examples might include initiatives 
such as GM Nation, GM-Jury, Nano-Jury, National Plant Biotechnology Consensus 
Conference and the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CORWM).  One 
reason why many policies shy away from a statutory function for a participatory 
process is that deliberative democracy can, potentially, conflict with representative 
democracy.  In a system of representative democracy, it is elected politicians who take 
decisions and are accountable as such and they are reluctant to cede decision-making 
power.   
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3.1.1.4 Expert-led decision-making 
 
This is the most frequently style of technical decision-making that has been adopted in 
the UK.  It is characterised by use of expert committees, conventionally constituted by 
technical experts only.  The use of expert committees came under fire, especially after 
the BSE crisis (van Zwanenberg & Millstone 2005).  Already in the 1990s, inclusion 
of non-technical members on committees was becoming more widely practised.  This 
included academics from non-technical disciplines, experts on ethics and morality, 
legal scholars, public figures, influential media figures and representatives of 
consumer and health organisations  
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3.1.1.5 Fully technocratic 
 
A fully technocratic approach to decision-making is, nowadays, rare.  It might survive 
in some political cultures which are not democratic.  In most democratic societies, 
there has been a sea-change from earlier closed practices by which decisions were 
made in an opaque fashion, influenced by pressure groups, special interests and so on.  
Technocracy was, in part, a response to these types of ‘irrational’ or ‘corrupt’ 
decision-making, which were not perceived as being socially ‘optimal’.  But one 
consequence of the opening-up and democratisation of policy-making, has also been a 
move away from elitist-based decision-making and a re-assertion of the role of 
politics and values at the core of government.  Technocracy never established itself 
too securely in the UK due to a particular tradition of political contest and pragmatic 
scepticism.   
 
3.1.1.6 The Implications of Choosing a Decision Making Style 
 
Many of the same engagement techniques used can be used to support different 
decision making styles.  Focus groups, for instance, are famously used by marketing 
and PR companies, as well as by governments and political parties, for intelligence 
gathering and to assess potential public reactions to messages, policies, actions and 
measures.  Therefore, methods are not restricted to a particular decision-making style, 
though there are some constraints, as in the case of a Citizens’ Jury.  This method is 
unlikely to be used in a technocratic or highly expert-led decision-making style.   
 
Organisations that are undertaking public engagement and communications activities 
might wish to evaluate what type of decision-making ‘philosophy’ they subscribe to, 
operate with, and believe will be most effective.  For example, if an organisation 
adopts an expert-led decision-making philosophy, then there would be little point 
embarking upon an extensive engagement campaign, except as a token gesture.  A 
focus group would, however, still be useful in gathering intelligence and 
understanding of how the public might react to a project.  If an organisation believes 
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that deliberative methods are more likely to lead to publics’ support, on the other 
hand, then simply conducting a survey or only holding a workshop would probably be 
insufficient.  It might also be worth considering what expectations publics or 
stakeholders have of involvement in decision making. 
 
3.1.1.7 The Participative Turn in Decision-Making  
 
A defining feature of the politics of the past several decades has been a move towards 
more participatory and deliberative processes.  This is a trend which can be witnessed 
across continents, countries, regions, cities and neighbourhoods.  While scientific and 
technical decision-making was, to begin with, relatively unaffected, the BSE episode, 
along with controversy over GMOs, led to a fundamental change in the UK.  Since the 
mid-1990s, participation in decision-making over new technologies has become the 
norm, not the exception.   
 
There has also been criticism of the ‘participative turn’. Critics say that token 
participation practices have sometimes been used to legitimate technocratic decision 
making, and that publics’ input has sometimes been ignored or heavily steered 
(Rayner 2003, 2009; Ward et al 2003). There is certainly a tension between the 
discourse on one level that increased public participation is desirable and the desire of 
proponents to keep maximum control over their projects. Token engagement has a 
tendency to backfire – if public input is asked for, and then disregarded publics tend 
to react strongly, possibly more strongly than if they had never been asked for any 
input. 
 
There are (at least) three reasons why participation is regarded as desirable.   
• Legal and Ethical: meeting the moral imperative and legislative requirements 
of participative democratic decision-making.  This relates to fulfilling peoples’ 
expectations about living in a democracy2.   
                                                 
2 See Chiavari et al (2009) for a discussion for a discussion of the regulatory context for participation in 
CCS projects. 
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• Pragmatic: evidence shows that there is a greater chance of support or 
acceptance when people feel they have had a chance to voice their opinion in a 
meaningful way (Toke 2005; Toke et al 2008; Loring 2007)) .   
• Instrumental: useful input can be gained, perhaps through local expertise, to 
improve the project (Yearley 2003) 
 
3.1.2 Risk and Technical Communication  
 
Different styles of decision-making tend to contain with them an implicit model of 
communication to the public.  The form of risk communication, and the risks as 
perceived by members of publics, can have a strong influence over project 
acceptability (Singleton et al 2008).  We can identify three distinct approaches to risk 
communication (Leiss, 1996).   
 
3.1.2.1 Information Deficit Model:  
 
The traditional approach has been to ‘convey probabilistic thinking to the general 
public and to educate the laypersons to acknowledge and accept the risk management 
practices of the respective institutions’ (IRGC, 2005:54).  This approach assumes that 
individuals define risk in technical terms and undertake risk calculations and 
comparisons in a largely technical sense.  It is the style of communication adopted by 
more technocratic technical decision-making.   
 
3.1.2.2 Persuasion Model:  
 
The limitations of the first approach became evident many decades ago when 
individuals and communities did not respond to risk as expected.  It came to be 
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realised that non-technical information was highly significant, for example the social 
and institutional context.  Given that most people were unable to engage in the 
technical discourse due to lack of time and motivation, a short-cut way of coming to a 
view on risk is for people to assess the organisations and institutions which are 
attempting to persuade them of some point-of-view.  This critical insight, first made 
by Brian Wynne, highlighted the importance of trust between the public and the 
‘experts’ or organisations promoting a new technology or development.  If trust levels 
were low, then however good the technical evidence and arguments, it was unlikely 
that the public would be persuaded.  One response to this was to use marketing and 
PR to try and persuade people to trust the experts and to modify their behaviour as 
necessary.   
‘The one-way communication process of conveying a message to the public in 
carefully crafted, persuasive language produced little effect.  Most respondents 
were appalled by this approach or simply did not believe the message, 
regardless how well it was packaged’ (IRGC, 2005: 54).   
The failure of the persuasion model has led to the development of a third approach.   
 
3.1.2.3 Two-Way Communication and Learning Model:  
‘The objective is to build mutual trust by responding to the concerns of the 
public and relevant stakeholders.  The ultimate goal of risk communication is 
to assist stakeholders in understanding the rationale of risk assessment results 
and risk management decisions, and to help them arrive at a balanced 
judgement that reflects the factual evidence about the matter at hand in 
relation to their own interests and values…Good practices in risk 
communication help stakeholders to make informed choices about matters of 
concern to them and to create mutual trust’.  (IRGC, 2005:54-55).   
Four major functions of risk communication have been identified within the two-way 
communication model, see Box 2.  For each of the functions the following topics need 
to be addressed (IRGC, 2005):   
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• Explain the concept of probability and stochastic effects 
• Explain the difference between risk and hazard  
• Deal with stigmatised risk agents or highly dreadful consequences 
• Cope with long-term effects 
• Provide an understanding of synergistic effects 
• Address the problem of remaining uncertainties and ambiguities  
• Cope with the diversity of stakeholders in risk appraisal and management  
• Cope with inter-cultural differences within pluralistic societies and between 
different nations and cultures.   
 
Box 2: Four Functions of Risk Communication (IRGC, 2005) 
i) Education and enlightenment:  inform the audience about the risks and the 
handling of these risks, including risk and concern assessment and 
management; 
ii) Risk training and inducement of behavioural change: help people cope 
with risks and potential disasters; 
iii) Creation of confidence in institutions responsible for the assessment and 
management of risk: give people the assurance that the existing risk 
governance structures are capable of handling risks in an effective, 
efficient, fair and acceptable manner (such credibility is crucial in 
situations in which there is a lack of personal experience and people 
depend on neutral and disinterested information).  Trust can only be earned 
and accumulated by effective performance.   
iv) Involvement in risk-related decisions and conflict resolution: give 
stakeholders and representatives of the public the opportunity to participate 
in the risk appraisal and management efforts and/or be included in the 
resolution of conflicts about risks and appropriate risk management 
options.   
 
3.1.3 Different types of Engagement: for Academic Research, 
Applied Research and Practice  
 
Engagement techniques can be used for a number of (mutually supporting) purposes.  
We draw a distinction here between engagement for academic research, applied 
research, and practice.  The traditional purpose of academic or basic research is to 
develop better understanding, e.g.  through theory development and hypothesis 
testing.   
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This provides a foundation for applied research which can be used as intelligence-
gathering for developers preparing to undertake a real engagement campaign.  
Applied research may be undertaken by universities, other research organizations, 
consultancies and companies, and could, potentially, lead on to designing a 
communications and engagement strategy.  Actually implementing an outreach, 
communications and engagement strategy would not conventionally be undertaken by 
a research organization.  This is the realm of practice and requires different skill-sets 
and competencies from those involved in research and intelligence-gathering.    
 
These three activities – basic research, applied research and practice – are not strictly 
demarcated and involve much exchange and iteration between one another.  Clearly, 
applied research builds upon basic research and practice is designed and undertaken 
with the results of research in mind.  Likewise, practice is typically what generates the 
‘raw material’ for research questions and hypotheses to be formulated.  An 
engagement, outreach or communications practice can build upon basic and applied 
research as indicated in the Figure 6 below.   
 
Engagement for Basic Research 
Engagement for Applied Research 
Designing an Engagement 
Campaign 
Engagement in 
practice 
Research 
Practice 
Time 
Figure 6 Engagement for different purposes, research to practice. 
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3.2 Designing an Engagement Strategy 
 
An engagement strategy should be specific to each context, suiting the project, its 
location, the developers’ philosophy and possibly matched to local expectations. 
 
3.2.1 Elements of an Engagement Strategy 
 
The elements listed here focus on engagement at the individual project level, and 
particularly on engaging with local publics.  Each element is explained in more detail 
below.  The elements do not have to occur in the order listed in Figure 7; the order 
and number of iterations will depend upon context specific factors as well as the 
approach of the project developer.  Three illustrative configurations are given, suiting 
different decision making styles (Figures 8 – 10). 
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•‘Social Permit’ to 
operate 
•Regulatory 
Permits in place 
•Local and National 
Planning 
permissions 
•On-going 
engagement 
throughout 
construction and 
operation phases 
•Engagement with 
Publics & 
Stakeholders 
•Communication 
with Publics, 
Stakeholders & 
Media 
•Responding to 
Issues as they 
come up 
•Risk 
Communication 
 
•Early Engagement  
•Stakeholder 
Mapping 
•Public mapping 
•Social Analysis 
•Location Analysis 
•Information 
Gathering 
•Begin building 
trust 
•Use information to 
begin designing  
communication and 
engagement 
campaign 
•Project Vision 
•Location 
•Design  
•Alternatives 
considered 
•Justification – why 
in general and why 
this specific 
project? 
•Possibility to 
modify project 
design to 
accommodate 
stakeholder 
preferences  
•The decision 
making style 
adopted 
•Degree of public 
and stakeholder 
participation 
desired 
•Approach to Risk 
Communication 
•Transparency 
•Willingness to 
modify philosophy 
depending upon 
stakeholder 
expectations 
 




Philosophy Project Design Early 
Engagement 
Engagement 
Campaign 
Acceptance & 
Maintaining 
Acceptance 
Figure 7 Elements of an Engagement Campaign 
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Expert Led, with Public Consultation 
Project 
Design 
Outreach and 
Consultations 
Acceptance? Construction, 
Operation. 
 On-going 
Outreach 
Stakeholder 
Identification 
Yes 
Seek 
Permission 
from a Higher 
Level 
No 
Risk Local 
Opposition 
Figure 8 Expert Led engagement strategy 
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Combination of Expert and Public Input 
 
 
Project Design 
Early 
Engagement 
 
Engagement 
Campaign 
Acceptance? Construction, 
Operation. 
 On-going 
Engagement 
Engagement 
Campaign 
Design 
Opportunity for 
Stakeholder or 
Public Input 
Yes 
Project Re-
Design 
No 
Figure 9 Combination of expert led and public input engagement strategy 
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Deliberative Process Informs Decision Making 
 
Project 
Concept 
Early 
Engagement 
Engagement 
Campaign 
Acceptance? 
Construction, 
Operation. 
 On-going 
Engagement 
Project & 
Engagement 
Campaign 
Design 
Yes No 
Acceptance? 
Yes 
No 
Figure 10 Deliberative process infrom project design engagement strategy 
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3.2.1.1 Philosophy 
 
What?  Various decisions to be made by the developer influencing the design of an 
engagement strategy, including: the style of decision making to be used, the approach 
to risk communication, the degree of transparency of process and degree of reflexivity 
and flexibility of process. 
Why?  Making assumptions explicit can help in deciding what kind of engagement 
campaign is desired, and what is most suited to a particular project.  Matching 
stakeholders’ and publics’ expectations to the engagement campaign delivered might 
be worthwhile. 
How?  Reviewing literature and previous cases can show what has worked well 
before (e.g.  Heiskanen et al 2008).  Ethical and legal principles may apply.   
When?  This must be decided in the very early stages of planning a project because a 
highly deliberative approach will engage stakeholders and publics early in the design 
process. 
 
3.2.1.2 Project Design 
 
What?  This includes all aspects of project design, from the initial justification for 
why the project is necessary and the developer’s vision for what the project should be; 
to the location, the scale, the infrastructure, the benefits and the risk assessment; to the 
construction, operation, long term monitoring and final decommissioning of the 
facility.  At all stages decisions may need to be justified with reference to the 
alternatives which have been considered.   
Why?  Allowing publics to understand how the project has been designed and why it 
has been designed the way it has can increase acceptance, and if proactive and timely 
can increase trust levels.   
How?  Depending upon the engagement strategy adopted, the developer may wish to 
keep publics informed as to how and when decisions are being made (transparency) 
and may wish to receive input from publics during the design stage (deliberation). 
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Methods to keep publics informed include press statements, newsletters and town 
meetings.  
When?  Depending on the engagement style, public input may be sought anywhere 
from very early to very late stages in the process; or may not be sought at all.  
Equally, publics may be kept informed as decisions are being made, only be informed 
once all decisions have been made or information provision may be somewhere in 
between.   
 
3.2.1.3 Early Engagement 
 
What?  An initial process of gathering the information useful at the design stage, 
including stakeholder and public identification and initial interactions; and beginning 
to understand the local context through the various research methods termed social 
characterisation.   
Why?  To understand and anticipate likely responses to a project, and possibly to 
modify project design.  The information gathered is also useful to design an 
appropriate engagement campaign, as well as start to build relationships between 
project staff and publics or stakeholders. 
How?  Early engagement techniques, especially face to face informal interviews and 
focus groups and surveys; study of the recent history of the community; analysis of 
local media and organisations.   
When?  This should be done fairly early on in the process, depending on what the 
results will be used for.  If the results will be used to influence project design then it 
must be earlier than if the results are used to influence only the engagement strategy. 
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Box 3: Social Characterisation 
What is social characterisation?  A way of assessing the various social factors in an area 
which may influence the publics’ response to a project.  The concept has been used in work 
done in the United States on the Futuregen and Regional Partnership projects.   
Why should social factors be considered?  Public views on CCS are generally not based 
solely upon an understanding of that technology, but are created in reference to a whole host 
of other knowledge and experience (Bradbury et al 2009).  A social characterisation can help 
determine if a project is more or less likely to be locally popular, and can provide useful 
information for designing an engagement campaign.   
What factors should be considered?  There are many factors to consider, and more will 
likely emerge during face to face work.  Main factors include, but are not limited to: knowledge 
and views on climate change, energy policy and different energy generation options; trust 
levels in the developer, regulatory agencies and various levels of government; local sense of 
empowerment; familiarity with industries related to CCS; local economy; population density; 
project fit with place identity; policy fit in local and national context; history regarding other 
developments, especially if there has been past opposition or recent unwelcome 
development; local media or opinion forming groups; existing perceptions of energy 
developments and CCS.   
What are the likely issues in Scotland?  Scotland has a history of fossil fuel extraction from 
onshore coal field and, more recently, from the North Sea.  Where experiences have been 
good this could be built upon for CCS; but where experiences been bad or are resented CCS 
may not be popular.  There are many well loved iconic landscapes which may not be suitable 
(or likely) for development.  Each area studied will present different issues.   
How do you do social characterisation?  Wade and Greenberg (2009) provide a useful 
guide in which they identify three stages: preliminary investigation using newspapers, 
websites and existing studies; direct engagement with key informants (interviews); and 
detailed data collection (focus groups, workshops, or surveys).  We term this ‘early 
engagement’.   
How long does social characterisation take?  Social characterisation can be integrated 
alongside technical site characterisation.  Depending on the level of detail, it may take a 
period of months. 
What methods are used for social characterisation?  There are various methods 
employed including but not limited to: reviewing newspapers, internet sites, community 
histories, existing studies; informal conversations, interviews, focus groups, workshops or 
surveys.    
Who should undertake a social characterisation?  The developer may wish to establish a 
communication and engagement team for the project, who will undertake social 
characterisation, design of an engagement strategy and implementing the engagement 
strategy.  Long term contact with the same staff members can build good relations between 
publics and developers. 
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3.2.1.4 Engagement Campaign  
 
What?  All dialogue and information sharing between the developer and other parties, 
once a project has been announced publicly.  This includes communication and 
outreach activities and engagement activities; and includes stakeholders and publics.  
Whilst a campaign is improved by careful planning, a degree of responsiveness is 
necessary in order to deal with issues as they come up. 
Why?  To build support for projects, it is necessary for publics and stakeholders to 
know about the project.  For stable long term support, it may be necessary to 
understand the project and the motivations for it. 
How?  Methods include focus groups, interviews, workshops, public meetings, 
exhibitions, citizen panels/jury, printed media, internet sites, press statements and 
newsletters.  A full list and explanations are given in Table 10 and Table 11 
When?  Engagement and communication activities should run concurrently 
throughout the duration of a project, raising awareness before any major activities are 
undertaken..   
 
Box 4: Aspects of an Inclusive Decision-Making Process (IRGC 2005) 
• There has been a major attempt to involve representatives of all key 
stakeholders. 
• There has been a major attempt to empower all actors to participate actively 
and constructively in the discourse. 
• There has been a major attempt to co-design the framing of the issue in a 
dialogue with these different groups.   
• There has been a major attempt to generate a common understanding of the 
magnitude of any possible risks (based on expertise of all participants) as well 
as the potential risk management options and to include a plurality of opinions 
that represent the different interests and values of all parties involved.   
• There has been a major effort to conduct a forum for decision-making that 
provides equal and fair opportunities for all parties to voice their opinion and 
to express their preferences.   
• There has been a clear connection between the participatory bodies of 
decision-making and the political implementation level.   
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Two central questions in structuring public and stakeholder engagement are: what and 
whom should be included?  Topic and issue selection may itself be participative, with 
early engagement helping to define topics issues and participants.  The International 
Risk Governance Council (IRGC 2005) has provided a set of criteria to address if the 
intention is to create an inclusive process (Box 4). 
 
Box 5: Stakeholder Engagement  
What are stakeholders?  Stakeholders can be defined as socially organised groups that are, 
or will be, affected by the outcome of the event or the activity (from which the risk originates) 
and/or by the (risk management) options taken.   
What is stakeholder mapping?  The process of identifying the key stakeholders that have 
an interest in the event or activity or in the management response to the activity.   
What are the main stakeholder groups?  A useful description is provided in Table 2.1.  
NETL (2009), pp.  18-19.  The key groups presented and described there are: officials, 
regulators, business interests, landowners and neighbours, civic groups, environmental 
groups, senior citizens, religious groups and educators.   
What are the key stakeholder groups in Scotland?  The developer is best placed to 
identify the key stakeholder groups with respect to a specific project.  Offshore development 
entails its own distinctive stakeholder groups, well known to the oil and gas sectors.  This 
includes: fishing interests (commercial & recreational), marine conservation and protection, 
Crown Estate, shipping and sailing interests, etc.   
How can stakeholder groups be identified?  CCS developers usually already have well 
developed identification of stakeholder groups.  Inclusion of additional stakeholder groups 
needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.  Strategies for identifying stakeholders 
include contacting or consulting: national government, local authorities, SEPA, SNH, 
websites, local phone books, interviews (snow-balling of contacts), local newspapers, local 
chamber of commerce, local outreach team members, town clerks or surveyors, legwork 
(driving around an area), religious leaders, local universities and colleges, established 
environmental groups (e.g.  Friends of the Earth, WWF, Transition Towns) and established 
marine societies / NGOs (e.g.  SAMS, RYA, Scottish Coastal Forum, etc.).   
How long does stakeholder engagement take?  It depends on the case, but it can be very 
time consuming where a complex project influences multiple interests and stakeholders.  
Early planning is likely to be essential.  Many consultancies offer professional stakeholder 
engagement services.   
What methods are used for stakeholder engagement?  See Table 10.  The principal 
methods employed are: interviews, informal conversations, focus groups, in-depth discussion 
groups (citizen panels), workshops and town meetings.    
Who should undertake stakeholder engagement?  The developer needs to be clearly in 
charge of the process, but may contract out the service to a consultancy, many of which 
nowadays offer professional stakeholder engagement services.  In selecting a consultant, it is 
recommended that at least one PhD-level trained expert in stakeholder engagement / 
analysis is involved in the team to ensure that the work takes account of state-of-the-art 
scholarship.   
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3.2.1.5 Acceptance, and Maintaining Acceptance 
 
What?  Various types of acceptance need to be obtained, including regulatory 
permits, planning permission and – the focus of this toolkit – a social permit to 
operate.  The social permit must be maintained; it can potentially be ‘revoked’ by new 
concerns which may be outside of the control of the developer.  The best way to guard 
against this is to maintain high levels of trust and to manage an open, transparent and 
robust process of engagement and communication, and of course a good safety record. 
Why?  Although not a legal requirement, local publics can make it very difficult and 
sometimes impossible for a project to go ahead.   
How?  Continuation of the engagement process, with an eye out for new interested 
parties and issues which may be raised.  Any of the same engagement technique are 
useful, as well as site visits and community benefits such as employment and possibly 
a community fund. 
When?  The engagement strategy, coupled with a good project, aims to achieve 
acceptance.  Once achieved it must be maintained through the construction, operation 
and decommissioning phases of the project. 
 
 
A distinctive feature of CCS is the long term nature of CO monitoring requirements.  
Some kind of engagement work should be planned throughout the 30 year after-
drilling time period during which the company is responsible before handing over to 
the government for long –term stewardship.  Raising this issue early may actually 
help publics’ trust in the accountability of the developer, and the government – it 
shows that plans are in place for long term issues. 
 
Long term support, and in particular a stable and robust public evaluation of CCS, that 
will not be susceptible to the latest media headlines or the inevitable setbacks, can 
only really come about if people are allowed to develop a deep understanding of the 
issues and work through their concerns.  The criteria in Box 6 are useful in 
determining if an engagement campaign will deliver these types of long term benefits. 
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Box 6: Criteria for evaluating the Quality of a Decision Making Process 
(IRGC 2005) 
• Have all arguments been properly tested?   
• Have all truth claims been fairly and accurately tested against commonly 
agreed standards of validation?   
• Has all the relevant evidence, in accordance with the actual state-of-the-art 
knowledge, been collected and processed?   
• Was systematic, experiential and practical knowledge and expertise adequately 
included and processed?   
• Were all interests and values considered and was there a major effort to come 
up with fair and balanced solutions?   
• Were all normative judgements made explicit and thoroughly explained?   
• Were normative statements derived from accepted ethical principles or legally 
prescribed norms?   
• Were all efforts undertaken to preserve plurality of lifestyle and individual 
freedom and to restrict the realm of collectively binding decisions to those 
areas in which binding rules and norms are essential and necessary to produce 
the wanted outcome?   
 
3.2.2 Evaluation of Engagement Practices  
 
Despite much research on, and practice of, participation and engagement, there has 
been surprisingly little attention paid to the evaluation of the activity (Burgess and 
Clark, 2009).  Evaluation contributes enormously to learning from previous work, and 
should be conducted in a way that accelerates the learning process. 
 
Evaluation of outcomes assesses how well the process scored against pre-defined 
criteria.  The following criteria for evaluating an engagement process and / or 
communication campaign may be useful, Box 7.   
 
A more detailed set of evaluatory criteria for public acceptance and process efficiency 
has been defined by Rowe & Frewer (2000), Table 7.  More technocratic models of 
decision making may reject certain aspects of these criteria (such as ‘influence’), 
which, in turn, may or may not affect public acceptance. 
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Box 7 Criteria for Evaluating the Outcome of a Decision Making Process 
(IRGC, 2005) 
• Effectiveness 
• Efficiency 
• Accountability 
• Legitimacy 
• Fairness 
• Transparency 
• Acceptance by the public 
• Ethical acceptability 
 
 
Criteria  Description  
Public Acceptance   
1.  Representativeness Representative sample of the affected population 
2.  Independence Process conducted in an independent, unbiased 
way  
3.  Early involvement  The earlier the stage of involvement the greater 
the sense of ownership of the process, especially 
at the stage where value judgements are 
important  
4.  Influence  Any participatory process should have a visible 
impact on policy 
5.  Transparency  The public should be able to see progress and 
how decisions are being made  
Effectiveness of 
process  
 
6.  Resource accessibility  Access to appropriate resources (information, 
experts, time, materials) to enable them to 
successfully fulfil their brief  
7.  Task definition  The scope of the exercise, the expected output 
and the mechanism of the procedure should be 
defined at the outset  
8.  Structured decision 
making 
To enable debate over the underlying 
assumptions of a decision, how the decision was 
made, the extent to which it was supported 
9.  Resource use 
efficiency  
The efficiency of the use of limited resources on 
the part of the developer and regulators  
Table 7 Evaluation Framework for Public Engagement (adapted from Rowe and 
Frewer, 2000) 
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3.2.3 Fitting an Engagement Strategy into Project Timelines 
It is a primary conclusion of NETL’s (2009) recent report that engagement and outreach should be integrated within normal project 
management.  Depending on how the engagement strategy is designed, fit with the project timeline will vary.  Project timelines will also vary in 
detail from project to project.  The environmental NGO Bellona (2009) has produced a number of illustrative timelines on this topic (Figure 11), 
and NETL (2009; pp39-41) provide a detailed table relating engagement activities to technical activities.   
The main observations are that engagement should begin as early as possible; be fitted to technical and regulatory stages; and should provide 
awareness of practical operations before they begin so that local publics are aware of what it is going on.   
 
 
 
Figure 11 Fitting an engagement strategy to project timelines (Bellona 2009) 
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3.2.4 Potential Frameworks: other best practice guidelines 
There is some useful work published for designing engagement campaign frameworks, timelines and advice; much of it based on first hand 
experience.  The best guidelines are listed in Table 8 below.  Ideally, the present study should be read in conjunction with these other 
engagement guidelines 
Project name  Team  Applications  References  Useful For Key Components  
Best Practices 
for Public 
Outreach and 
Education for 
Carbon 
Storage 
Projects  
National 
Energy 
Technology 
Laboratory 
(NETL) 
(USA)  
CCS projects NETL 
(2009)  
Essential reading.  
Useful for all 
aspects of 
engagement and 
communication, 
especially 
stakeholders.  
Provides detailed 
guidance on 
specific topics.   
This is the most comprehensive best practice 
guide so far published on public outreach on 
CCS, building upon the extensive experience 
of the US Regional Carbon Sequestration 
Partnerships.  It outlines ten best practices as 
follows:  
1. integrate public outreach with project 
management; 
2. establish a strong outreach team;  
3. identify key stakeholders;  
4. conduct and apply social 
characterization;  
5. develop an outreach strategy and 
communication plan;  
6. develop key messages;  
7. develop outreach materials tailored to 
the audience; 
8. actively oversee and manage the 
outreach programme throughout the life 
of the CO2 storage project;  
9. monitor the performance of the outreach 
programme and changes in public 
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perceptions and concerns; 
10. be flexible – refine the public outreach 
programme as warranted.   
 
ESTEEM  Eindhoven, 
ECN 
(Netherlands)  
Energy 
projects -  
stakeholders 
and local 
communities  
Raven et al.  
(2009)  
Designing a 
project with a high 
degree of public 
and stakeholder 
participation.   
Proposes a six-stage framework for project-
based public engagement: projects past and 
present; vision building; identifying conflicting 
issues; portfolio of options; getting to shake 
hands; recommendations on action.   
Carbon 
Capture and 
Storage 
Communication 
Workshops  
University of 
Calgary, 
IISD, Climate 
Change 
Central 
(Canada)  
CCS projects 
– 
stakeholders, 
local 
communities 
and the 
public  
Climate 
Change 
Central 
(2007)  
Designing a public 
communications 
strategy ad 
campaign. 
A guide to ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ in communicating 
CCS to the public from a range of different 
perspectives.  This includes how to build trust:   
1. commitment – creating or negotiating 
reciprocal and verifiable behaviour;  
2. accountability – doing what you say you 
will do, transparency, clarity; 
3. disclosure – sharing weaknesses,  flaws 
and uncertainties; 
4. acknowledgement – recognize different 
contributions and sources of power, 
influence and knowledge. 
It also encompasses seven principles for 
undertaking public engagement work (accept 
and involve the public; plan carefully and 
evaluate performance; listen to your audience; 
be open, frank and honest; coordinate and 
collaborate with local credible sources; meet 
the needs of the media; speak clearly and with 
compassion).   
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An Integrated 
Roadmap of 
Communication 
Activities 
Around CCS in 
Australia and 
Beyond  
Centre for 
Low 
Emission 
Technology, 
CSIRO  
(Australia)  
CCS projects 
- 
stakeholders, 
local 
communities 
and the 
public 
Ashworth et 
al.  (2007)  
Recommendations 
for stakeholder 
and public 
communications 
strategies.  .   
Recommendations to industry on how to 
devise communications strategies on CCS:  
1. be proactive in communicating through 
dialogue and discussion;  
2. partner with credible environmental 
NGOs and other trusted sources in 
developing communications material; 
3. develop education curricula and 
materials;  
4. engage high profile public figures to 
stimulate discussion;  
5. test materials through use of focus 
groups with a range of target audiences;  
6. develop multi-media communication 
tools; 
7. demonstrate support for renewable 
energy as part of portfolio of solutions to 
climate change; 
8. identify resources to support activity.   
Breaking 
Ground: 
Engaging 
Communities in 
Extractive and 
Infrastructure 
Projects  
World 
Resources 
Institute 
(USA)  
Extractive 
and 
infrastructural 
projects – 
local 
communities  
WRI (2009)  Designing a public 
engagement 
strategy. 
Presents seven principles for effective 
community engagement:  
1. prepare communities before engaging; 
2. determine what level of engagement is 
needed; 
3. integrate community engagement into 
each phase of the project cycle; 
4. include traditionally excluded 
stakeholders; 
5. gain free, prior and informed consent; 
6. resolve community grievances through 
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dialogue; 
7. promote participatory monitoring by 
local communities.   
ZeroGen New 
Generation 
Power – A 
Framework for 
Engaging 
Stakeholders  
ZeroGen Pty 
Ltd., CSIRO 
(Australia)  
CCS projects 
– 
stakeholders, 
local 
communities   
Simpson & 
Ashworth 
(2009)  
Designing a 
stakeholder 
engagement 
strategy.   
Reviews an approach to stakeholder 
engagement by one company and provides 
some general recommendations to developers:  
1. the need for a stakeholder analysis to 
identify those stakeholder groups with 
the potential to have the greatest impact 
on the project, either positive or 
negative; 
2. appropriate communication activities to 
then engage the prioritized stakeholder 
groups; 
3. champions within the influential groups 
that can help to raise awareness of the 
benefits of the project, particularly for 
government, investment and insurance 
agencies; 
4. the use of community liaison groups, to 
provide the community with a voice, to 
meet regularly with the Project team; 
5. proactive engagement with the local 
media to advertise project 
developments, public meetings and 
present the latest information about 
Project developments; 
6. applying the principles of honesty, 
transparency and respect in all 
interactions.   
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Guidelines for 
Public 
Consultation 
and 
Participation in 
CCS Projects  
 
 
 
Bellona 
Europa 
(Belgium)  
CCS projects  Bellona 
Europa 
(2009)  
Fitting 
engagement 
strategies to 
technical and 
regulatory project 
timelines. 
Provides a useful set of concepts and 
resources for guiding a developer in designing 
public consultation and participation.   
1. frame CCS in the context of climate 
change mitigation and as part of a 
portfolio of solutions; 
2. understand factors contributing to risk 
perceptions in the area;  
3. identify stakeholders and their interests 
in the area; 
4. convey simple, clear and accurate 
descriptions, illustrated materials, 
printed documents and models; 
5. hold face-to-face interviews and include 
experts at meetings so that the public 
can see that the developer takes its 
questions seriously; 
6. provide the opportunity for the public to 
debate the issues openly and to reach 
their own informed judgements; 
7. take the effort to organise and attend 
public meetings, giving high quality 
presentations and briefings; 
8. use established procedures for 
including stakeholders, to promote 
dialogue and to reach consensus; 
9. include site visits; 
10. aim to build positive attitudes towards 
the technology; 
11. make a commitment to take account of 
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the results of public dialogue and to 
monitor public opinions; 
12. keep stakeholders informed and create 
mechanisms for providing up-to-date 
information with clear ways of attaining 
public comments.   
Table 8 Best practice frameworks and guidelines for engagement and communication activities.
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3.3 Implementing an Engagement Campaign 
This section contains practical information on topics to be discussed, engagement and communication techniques and materials to be used during 
engagement campaigns. 
3.3.1 The CCS chain: unpacking the variables 
Table 9 presents a non-exhaustive list of potential topics about which issues may be raised. This approach starts from the various aspects of the 
CCS chain and asks what issues may arise; but it is more illustrative than exhaustive, and should be used as starting point only. 
Topic Variables  Issues Groups affected 
Technology: 
Capture Unit 
Precombustion, 
Postcombustion, 
Oxyfuel. 
Visual appearance, noise, size, degree 
to which they are perceived as unknown 
and risky. 
Local publics 
Truck,  Increased truck traffic, safety. Local publics 
Ship, Onshore terminals, safety. Local publics 
Technology: 
Transport 
Pipeline Potentially many sites for opposition.  
Gaining permission to use land.  
Environmentally sensitive areas.  Safety 
fears.   
Local publics, land owners 
and managers, landscape 
protection groups, ecosystem 
protection groups. 
Onshore Safety from leakage, seismic activity, 
water contamination, house price 
effects, local ecological impacts, long 
term liability for stored CO. 
Local publics. Technology: 
Storage 
Offshore Potential for leakage to affect marine 
ecosystems. 
Infrastructure affects other ocean users. 
Ecosystem protection 
organisations, fishermen, 
shipping, other energy 
infrastructure owners 
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EOR Opportunity for increased oil production, 
increased revenue, using CO for 
‘something useful’.   
Hypocrisy of storing CO to extract fossil 
fuels. 
Local publics, anti fossil fuel 
campaigners. 
Gasfield/Oilfield/Saline Aquifer Security of storage – fossil fuel fields 
are better understood by publics, but 
may be considered to have many test 
wells and therefore less secure. 
Local publics. 
Coal Environmental damages from coal 
sourcing and combustion (e.g. sulphur, 
particulates). Increased coal use due to 
efficiency losses.  
Local publics, anti coal 
campaigners, environmental 
groups. 
Gas Increased fuel use due to efficiency 
losses. 
Local groups, anti fossil fuel 
campaigners. 
Heavy Oils/Petroleum Coke Environmental damages due to 
combustion, contaminates in fuel 
source.  
Using a by-product in an efficient way 
could be perceived positively.  
Local groups, environmental 
groups. 
Fuel 
Biomass Source of biomass – contribution to 
deforestation or food price rises. 
Local groups, environmental 
groups. 
Pilot to Commercial scale It seems that larger facilities attract 
more interest/concern  
Local publics Scale of facility 
Similarity to what was there before Any changes are potential issues e.g.  Local publics 
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increased vehicle transport; new use of 
chemicals (e.g.  amines); storage of 
flammable materials. 
Long term 
storage 
Location of storage site, long term 
plans for site, any other operators, 
migration of CO. 
Will monitoring and necessary work be 
kept up after the project has finished?  
Who will ensure this?  Safety and CO 
reductions might be compromised. 
Local Publics 
Wilderness 
 
Threat to ecosystems.  Place identity.  
National parks. 
Local publics; concerned 
non-local publics; landscape 
protection groups 
Rural Threats to ‘character’ of a place – 
identity and attachment issues.  Viewing 
it as ‘cleaning up someone else’s mess’. 
Local publics; concerned 
non-local publics; landscape 
protection groups 
Town Possible threat to ‘character’ of place.   Local publics 
Locations 
Urban High population density – opposition 
more likely to snowball. 
Local publics 
Need for employment Employment benefits of facility will be of 
greater value if employment is needed. 
Local publics 
Familiar with fossil fuel industry Existing understanding and trust makes 
CCS easier to explain.  Bad 
experiences with fossil fuel industry will 
have the opposite effect. 
Local publics 
Local Economy 
Non-industrial area Threat to place – industrialising a non-
industrial area 
Local publics, landscape 
protection groups 
History with 
developments 
Trust in developers/ regulators High trust levels help in conveying 
substantive information to publics; and 
Local publics 
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help allay safety concerns. 
Development fatigue Too much development in one area 
may lead to opposition 
Local Publics 
Responses to previous 
developments/controversies 
Previous failures of the democratic 
process may make opposition more 
likely. 
Local Publics 
Sense of community empowerment Where communities feel ‘in control’ of 
their future and ability to right wrongs 
done, they are more willing to accept 
perceived risks. 
Local Publics 
Table 9 Aspects of the CCS chain and potential issues which might arise. 
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Box 8 Media Engagement  
What is the media?  Those organisations involved in preparing, presenting and broadcasting 
or otherwise disseminating written, audio-visual (TV and radio) and web-based 
communications.  
Why does the media matter?  Media representation has become pivotal in many public 
debates on contemporary issues and frequently ‘shapes’ events as well as responding to 
external pressure-groups and ‘spin-doctors’.  The theory of risk amplification posits that the 
media is a key agent in the escalation of the perceived risks associated with certain 
technologies or issues.  
What media should be engaged?  The local and regional media can have a very important 
role in influencing perceptions of proposed and planned new development and infrastructure. 
The local media has had an important role in a number of CCS case-studies examined in this 
report (e.g. Barendrecht, Greenville).  National media obviously has a wider coverage and will 
sometimes pick-up on local disputes (e.g. this happened in the case of Barendrecht, which 
attracted widespread national attention in the Netherlands). Large companies and 
environmental NGOs are well versed at providing information in a media-friendly format 
and/or at staging events to attract media attention (the Climate Camp being a good example).  
All levels and types of media are, therefore, important in devising an engagement strategy.   
How should a developer communicate with the media?  Most major companies have 
professional communication managers and offices which plan and undertake public relations  
and external communications work. It is also common for major companies to out-source 
communications work to specialist PR / communications companies. In some cases, it may 
be more effective for an umbrella organisation to undertake the lead role in public relations 
work – e.g. the Carbon Capture Project or the CCSA.  In other cases, an NGO such as 
Bellona or Greenpeace might lead a media campaign that is directly relevant to companies’ 
CCS policies and activities and a developer might wish to have capacity to consider, respond 
and react if appropriate. A CCS media engagement activity should take account of the 
existing media work of the organisation, while recognising the distinctive features of CCS and 
other engagement work by umbrella organisations.  
How should a CCS press release be written?  NETL has provided some useful guidance 
on writing press releases (NETL, 2009, page 47). Amongst the key points: keep it short, using 
the Associated Press Style Guide; write a strong opening and lead-off with a ‘capsule’ of the 
most important information (who, what, where, when, why) then elaborate in subsequent 
paragraphs; write a complete story as you want it told (it may be used almost without 
alteration); write in a direct, plain style that avoids jargon, clichés and hyperbole; spell out 
acronyms; use active verbs where possible; provide concise explanations of unfamiliar terms 
and concepts; consider using direct quotes from reputable sources to provide a first-person 
point of view; get several people to proof read carefully; check any images to ensure they do 
not contain any unintended visual messages (some without a hardhat on at a drill site, for 
example); get permission to use outside sources; include brief background on the 
organisation(s) behind the project or event; gain exposure for the press release by posting on 
websites, alerting media contacts and potentially interested parties, etc.  
How long does media engagement take?  It depends on the case, but a media 
engagement activity may proceed concurrently with the different phases of a CCS project.  It 
is worth while cultivating good relations with key media organisations and personnel and to try 
and encourage journalists to take a personal interest in the project. Invite journalists to visit 
the company and (some aspect of) the planned CCS project-site: this can make all the 
difference to a journalist’s understanding of what is being proposed.  
Be proactive!  Don’t wait for others to be the first to publicise the proposal or development. 
Rather plan to work with the media from an early stage and develop the key messages that 
the developer wishes to convey.  Ensure that sufficient resource is available for the activity.  
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3.3.2 Engagement Techniques 
Engagement is a two way flow of information between publics/stakeholders and developers/experts/proponents. The goal is that publics’ and 
stakeholders’ support for the project is built by asking questions they may have, giving input to decisions and improving their sense of 
empowerment and trust in the project; and for the developer to better understand the publics and stakeholders, in order to improve the project 
and /or engagement strategy.  A list of methods and explanations is given in Table 10. 
 
Method  Brief Description  Strengths  Weaknesses Examples in the CCS 
field  
Surveys / 
questionnaires 
 
Useful for 
information 
gathering, theory  / 
hypothesis testing 
and applied 
research  
 
Cost:  £5K - £20K  
Structured set of 
questions  
 
15 mins to 1 hour  
 
Sample size 
depends on target 
population size  
 
Typically 100 to 
1000s  
A large sample can be 
surveyed  
Lends itself to quantification  
Can be designed to test 
hypotheses and to be 
statistically representative  
Online polls now available 
using pre-arranged samples  
Can use more complex 
strategies, such as MADA, 
conjoint analysis, analytical 
hierarchy process, etc.   
Usually only short time 
window available for 
response  
Can be undermined by poor 
design  
Hard to get a good 
understanding of the 
underlying reasoning 
(cognitive and other thought 
processes) behind the 
responses 
Hard to know whether the 
respondent really 
understands the question or 
Public  
Curry et al.  (2005)  
De Best-Waldhober et 
al.  (2009) 
Dammen et al (2006) 
Ha-Dong et al.  (2009)  
Itaoka et al.  (2009) 
Johnsson et al.  (2010)  
Reiner et al. (2006)  
Shackley et al.  (2005)  
Sharp et al.  (2009)  
Terwel et al.  (2009 a 
&b)  
 
Stakeholders  
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whether they interpret it in 
the way intended  
Gough (2008)  
Shackley et al.  (2007)  
Shackley et al. (2009) 
Interviews   
 
Useful for 
information 
gathering, theory  / 
hypothesis testing 
and applied 
research  
 
 
 
Cost:  £2K - £20K  
Structured or semi-
structured set of 
questions  
 
Face-to-face  
 
Telephone 
 
15 mins to 2 hours  
 
Sample size 
depends on target 
population size  
 
Typically 10’s to 
100  
 
Allows issues to be dealt 
with considerable depth 
 
Allows questioner to ensure 
that the respondent 
understands the question  
 
Allows questioner to 
understand the reasoning 
behind a response and to 
follow-up a response   
 
Allows respondent to clarify 
issues and ask their own 
questions  
 
Can collect quantitative as 
well as qualitative data  
 
Resource intensive – the 
best interviews are face-to-
face hence require travel 
time  
 
Because of resource 
requirements, unlikely that a 
statistically representative 
number of interviews can be 
undertaken  
 
Likely to be more valuable 
for  qualitative data 
collection than for 
quantitative data  
Public  
Palmgren et al (2004) 
Wallquist et al.  (2009)  
 
Stakeholders  
Fishedick et al.  (2008)  
Gough et al.  (2008) 
Hund and Judd (2008)  
Shackley et al.  (2005)  
Wong-Parodi et al. 
(2008) 
Workshops 
 
Useful for 
information 
gathering, applied 
research and during 
an engagement 
Range of formats 
possible 
 
Usually focused 
around a topic 
guide  
 
Interactive and participative  
 
Agenda can be reasonably 
open-ended 
 
Efficient use of resources – 
can liaise with a wide range 
May be somewhat 
unstructured 
 
Membership not always 
clearly demarcated 
 
Representativeness of 
Ashworth et al.  (2008) 
(small group) 
Ashworth et al. (2009) 
(large group) 
Stephens et al. (2009) 
UKERC CCS Roadmap 
process  
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campaign 
 
Cost:  c.  £3K each  
Number of 
participants limited 
by what is a 
manageable 
number 
 
Typically 5 to 100 
of individuals cost-
effectively  
 
participants frequently 
unknown and/or 
questionable  
 
Too lacking in structure for 
use with most public 
samples – better suited for 
stakeholder work  
 
Town Meetings  
 
Useful for an 
engagement 
campaign  
 
Cost:  £2K each +  
 
 
Typically a panel of 
representatives 
present and 
comment on the 
project and answer 
questions about it 
in front of a public 
audience  
 
Needs careful 
design and 
facilitation to 
ensure that it is not 
perceived as 
biased or run 
incompetently.   
 
Number of 
participants limited 
by what is a 
Allows the full scope of a 
project to be presented and 
discussed in open.   
 
Allows a wide range of 
participants to have a say 
and to provide feedback.   
 
Allows independent experts 
and stakeholders to be 
given a ‘voice’ in responding 
to and commenting on the 
project.  This can 
(potentially) increase the 
credibility of the project by 
establishing the views of 
key opinion-formers.   
 
  
Sometimes hard to structure 
and requires very good 
facilitation to ensure that the 
key issues are covered and 
the meeting not side-
tracked.   
 
The process is quite 
vulnerable to vocal minorities 
and opposition groups.  It is 
unlikely that the meeting 
could succeed in its aims if a 
group of participants is 
determined to derail it.   
 
It may be difficult to cover 
the full set of issues that 
need addressing in a single 
town meeting, so a series 
may be required.  Getting 
Total (2008)  
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manageable 
number 
 
Typically 5 to 100 
 
 
 
across technical, potentially 
complex, material rapidly 
and understandably can be 
challenging.   
Focus groups 
  
Useful for 
information 
gathering, theory  / 
hypothesis testing, 
applied research, 
and testing ongoing 
reactions to an 
engagement 
campaign 
 
Cost:  c.  £3K each 
Semi-structured   
 
1 -3  hour 
discussion  
 
Number of 
participants limited 
by what is a 
manageable 
number 
 
Typically 5 to 15  
Interactive and participative  
 
Focused and facilitated 
discussions around topic 
guide  
 
Allows participants to create 
collective understandings 
and interpretations  
 
Well designed to address 
specific research questions 
 
Groups work best with small 
numbers (<10) so hard to 
make representative 
 
Resource intensive  - 
payment for participating is 
usual  
 
Groups receive information 
in such a way that they are 
no longer representative of 
the community or sub-group 
from which they are recruited  
 
Bradbury et al.  (2009)  
Gough et al.  (2002)  
 
Instructions in 
NETL:(2009) pp.54-58. 
Citizen Panels   
 
In-depth Discussion 
Groups  
 
Useful for 
information 
gathering, , theory  / 
Semi-structured  
 
Similar to focus 
groups but 
discussions 
continued over a 
number of sessions 
– typically 3 to 10   
Allows much more in-depth 
analysis of issues than most 
other methods 
 
Allows detailed and 
structured information to be 
presented to groups in 
prescribed order   
Very resource intensive  
 
Very difficult to make 
representative of a target 
population  
 
Delineation of groups usually 
and unavoidably quite crude 
CASSEM project (not 
publicly available)  
Shackley et al.  (2005)  
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hypothesis testing, 
applied research 
and during an 
engagement 
campaign 
 
Cost:  c.  £10K +  
 
Number of 
participants limited 
by what is a  
manageable 
number 
 
Typically 5 to 15 
 
 
External experts can speak 
directly to the participants  
 
Participants in groups can 
engage in a direct dialogue 
with external participants  
 
Allows participants and the 
facilitator to follow-up 
questions and seek for 
specific information in 
between meetings  
 
Allows groups to formulate 
their own ideas and 
recommendations  
 
Groups can assess material 
developed for a 
communications or 
engagement plan 
 
(e.g.  based on gender, 
socio-economic group, place 
of residence, etc.)  
 
The representativeness of 
the group as an indicator of 
initial public perceptions of a 
project decreases as more 
information is provided and 
as participants themselves 
seek-out additional 
information.   
 
Responses may be quite 
dependent upon the 
particular individuals 
involved.  The small number 
of groups typically held 
means that bias can be 
introduced by dominant 
individuals. 
Citizens Jury  
 
Useful for 
information 
gathering, applied 
research and during 
Various designs 
possible, from an 
extended citizens 
panel to an 
extended town 
meeting.  Meetings 
Due to the fact that a 
citizens jury has some 
decision-making power, it 
has more credibility and 
status than other methods.  
The public may, therefore, 
It can be difficult to manage 
a citizens jury and it may 
require significant 
administrative support.   
 
A well-trained facilitator is 
None as yet   
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an engagement 
campaign 
 
Cost: c.  £50K +  
 
occur over an 
extended period of 
time, as necessary 
to reach a decision.   
 
Usually has some 
decision-making 
power, such as 
influence upon 
legislators or the 
public in an open 
ballot.   
 
The ‘Planning Cell’ 
model used in 
Germany typically 
involves 300 
individuals, 
whereas the UK 
citizen jury typically 
involves 10 to 15 
individuals.   
 
come to trust in, and take 
note of, its deliberations 
more than is the case for 
focus groups, citizen 
panels, or other methods.   
 
The jury itself should be 
self-organising and 
managing to a large extent, 
which reduces the ability of 
other interest groups to 
introduce bias.   
required, as is a ‘go-
between’ the jury and the 
sponsors of the project.   
 
This is a costly exercise 
compared to other methods.   
Table 10 Engagement techniques.  
Nb: cost estimates do not include the cost of the time of staff from organisations that are promoting / advocating the project.  The lead time on all 
these methods is a minimum of one month.  Some methods by their nature continue for a longer period. 
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3.3.3 Communication and Outreach Techniques  
 
A one-way flow of information from developers/experts to publics, stakeholders and media.  Communication alone is not enough to satisfy most 
people – questions will be asked and should be answered, therefore engagement is also necessary. Communication materials are essential, 
however, and can convey a wide range of useful information. Issues identified during early engagement should help design communication 
materials and topics, and popular wider issues should be included even if they seem to be not directly relevant to the particular project. A neutral 
tone presenting factual information is generally preferred to self-promotion or a persuasive tone, and communication materials can lose their 
credibility if the developer is perceived as untrustworthy or dishonest.  A full list and explanations are given in Table 11.  Those methods which 
include face to face contact offer the potential for engaging in dialogue – thus may become engagement activities. 
 
Method  Brief Description  Strengths  Weaknesses Examples in the CCS field  
Printed Materials 
 
 
Leaflets 
 
Fact sheets 
 
Posters 
 
Newsletters 
Can reach a wide audience. 
 
Can convey a lot of 
information on a wide range 
of topics  
 
Hard copies are somehow 
more ‘real’ than computer 
May not be read, or not 
read in detail 
 
Poorly designed printed 
media may be 
misunderstood and have 
adverse effects. 
 
CO Capture Project’s s ‘In-
Depth’ Leaflet 
http://www.co2captureproject
.com/reports/In-
depth_brochure_2_page.pdf 
 
ZEP’s ‘The Hard facts behind 
CCS’ 
http://www.zeroemissionsplat
form.eu/component/downloa
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  information 
 
Regular newsletters can 
build a sense of inclusion in 
project 
ds/?id=450 
 
HECA’s newsletters for Kern 
County 
http://archive.constantcontact
.com/fs068/1102686630376/
archive/1103119523975.html 
 
Guidelines for producing 
materials NETL (2009) 
pp.48-50 
 
Internet Resources 
 
  
Project website  
 
Easy access for publics and 
stakeholders 
 
Allows for regular updates 
 
All relevant information can 
be kept in one place 
 
Can link to independent 
sources of supporting 
information, or similar 
projects 
 
Potentially can included 
blogsites or ‘webinair’ type 
real-time discussions to 
allow a dialogue to occur   
Not accessible to those 
without computer access 
 
 
Gateway Gas Storage (very 
good website, but not CCS) 
http://www.gatewaystorage.c
o.uk/ 
 
Total’s Lacq project 
http://www.total.com/en/chall
enges/carbon-dioxide-
capture-and-geological-
storage/lacq-project-
940768.html 
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Videos 
 
  
May be short or long 
depending on topic 
 
May be specially 
developed for a 
project, or be generic 
dealing with general 
issues 
 
Once developed can be 
reused many times 
 
Can use computer graphics 
to show sub surface or 
proposed developments 
 
May not be able to go into 
much detail without losing 
narrative structure 
 
 
 
Film by Shell: 
http://www.shell.com/hom/co
ntent/innovation/managing_e
missions/ccs 
 
 
Animation by ZEP: 
http://www.zeroemissionsplat
form.eu/safe-
storage.html/closing-the-
carbon-loop-reducing-co2-
emissions 
 
 
Lectures, 
Presentations 
 
 
Can be an open event, 
or invitation only 
 
May be a small or 
large number of 
attendees 
 
Could be at an existing 
event (e.g.  a rotary 
club meeting) or a 
specially organised 
event 
Allows the full scope of a 
project to be presented and 
discussed 
 
Allows attendees some 
interaction with a 
representative of the 
developer 
 
Allows questions to be 
asked 
 
Can be made specific to the 
Overly technical 
presentations will not be 
understood  
 
May become a forum for 
criticism if public feel they 
have no other route to 
express themselves 
Battelle presentation for 
Greenville, Ohio 
http://216.109.210.162/userd
ata/whatsnew/public_meeting
_8-13-08.pdf  
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project 
  
Exhibitions 
 
 
An open event with 
information about a 
project, and 
opportunity to talk with 
representatives of the 
developer 
 
May last for a few 
hours to a few days, or 
even longer 
 
May travel to various 
locations 
Many different types of 
media can be held in one 
event – e.g.  can include 
written, poster, video and 
presentation 
 
Offers opportunity for face 
to face discussions 
 
Can be repeated to update 
on progress 
 
 
Only lasts for a short time 
– some may not be able to 
attend. 
 
Resource intensive if one 
or more persons are 
manning the exhibition 
desk  
 
Gateway organised 
successful exhibitions. 
 
SCCS has exhibited at the 
Edinburgh Science Festival  
Site Visits 
  
A group of invited or 
interested people can 
be shown round a site 
in development or 
operation 
 
May be offered 
regularly, or to mark 
particular 
developments. 
 
Offers participants direct 
experience of CCS 
 
Opportunity for questions 
 
Media can be involved 
Relatively small numbers 
can attend 
 
Resource intensive if one 
or more persons are 
required to host visits 
(sometimes ex-employees 
will do this on a voluntary 
basis) 
Guidelines in NETL (2009) 
pp.51-53 
 
Information Centre 
 
Can be organised by 
the developer and on 
developer’s site - or be 
Permanent location offers 
good access to information 
 
Under trained staff can 
give a bad impression. 
 
Scottish Power has a visitor 
centre at Longannet  
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funded in part by the 
developer  but 
organised by an 
independent third party 
 
 
 
May be used to host events 
 
Opportunities for questions, 
and range of other media to 
be available. 
 
Potentially resource-
intensive 
Media Statements Press releases 
 
TV, radio or 
newspaper interviews 
 
Local media or national 
media 
 
 
Messages reach a wide 
audience 
 
Media coverage will be  in 
some cases inevitable, so 
proactive engagement may 
be preferable 
 
Positive interpretations may 
become amplified 
Loss of control over the 
messages. 
 
Negative interpretations 
can become amplified 
Guidelines in NETL (2009) 
p.23, 47. 
Table 11 Communication and outreach techniques 
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3.3.4 Materials for use in Outreach and Communication 
Quite a number of examples of outreach materials have been produced, mostly focussing on the justifications for CCS, the various capture 
processes and the how storage works.  Although some new materials have been developed since, David Reiner (2008) comprehensively 
reviewed publicly available outreach materials.  Materials are of variable quality; the better materials are listed here, and it has been mentioned 
where the materials are especially good.   
 
Developer  Materials Source 
Zero Emissions 
Platform (ZEP) 
 
Three animations dealing with the reasons for CCS, the capture process, 
and the storage process. 
 
Fact Sheets and publications in the information section. 
 
Background information on various projects, and links to other resources. 
 
The resources are of high quality. 
 
The website is also accessible and useful to a lay audience or audience 
with knowledge of CCS 
http://www.zeroemissionsplatform
.eu/ 
 
CO Capture 
Project (CCP) 
A factsheet called ‘In-Depth’ is of particular interest – to scale, it conveys 
the depth to which CO is injected. 
 
A streaming video introducing CCS. 
 
http://www.co2captureproject.org/ 
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Various images and diagrams taken from reports. 
 
A more technical report aimed towards the media and stakeholders who 
would like a deeper understanding. 
 
Bellona 
Foundation 
 
  
Website which details arguments for, and explains CCS. 
 
Provides links to various other NGO websites. 
 
An ‘interactive’ presentation, which has animated slides and info boxes. 
 
A video is also available on youtube. 
 
http://www.bellona.org/ccs/index_
html 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=lH3hgqLM94U 
 
Shell 
 
 
One good video explaining CCS. 
 
Three animations: ‘Is this a new idea’, the capture process and the 
storage process. 
 
http://www.shell.com/hom/content
/innovation/managing_emissions/
ccs 
CCSA 
 
 
Three pamphlets of increasing length to suit more or less interested 
audiences.  Describe CCS and the reasons behind it. 
 
http://www.ccsassociation.org.uk/
index.htm 
Statoil 
  
Some videos of the Statoil offshore rigs give an interesting impression of 
the location of offshore storage 
 
Videos and animations explain CCS at the Sleipner and Snovit sites. 
 
http://www.statoil.com/en/newsan
dmedia/multimedia/filmsandvideo
s/pages/default.aspx 
 
Scottish Power A large collection of videos and animations, explaining how CCS works, 
the arguments for it, and advocacy from politicians, NGOs, and Scottish 
Power themselves.  Of good quality. 
http://www.scottishpower.com/car
bon_capture_storage/default.asp 
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Three powerpoint presentations are on the site. 
 
Rolling videos are available at CCStv website. 
 
http://www.scottishpowerccs.tv/ 
 
IEAGHG Seven factsheets and one full length report for a lay audience on the 
various aspects of CCS 
http://www.ieaghg.org/index.php?
/20091218110/what-is-css.html 
CONet Five powerpoint presentations available for download 
 
Pamphlets in many European languages 
 
Useful links to many other ongoing CCS projects 
 
http://www.co2net.eu/public/down
loads.asp 
Masdar and 
Hydrogen Energy 
A video which clearly explains EOR. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=Il0Dw3vfjZk&feature=related 
UNEP A simplified version of the IPCC special report on CCS, designed for an 
interested lay or stakeholder audience. 
http://www.unep.org/dec/docs/CC
S_guide.pdf 
COCRC Eleven factsheets 
 
Thirteen posters 
 
Five videos 
 
Image Library  
http://www.co2crc.com.au/ 
CCS Education 
Initiative 
A video explaining CCS 
 
Links to a lot of presentations given by a range of people and 
organisations. 
http://www.ccs-
education.net/index.html 
Table 12 Materials to be used in communication and outreach campaigns 
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Case Study  Barendrecht, Netherlands  
Type of project CCS demonstration project, onshore. 
Developer Shell 
Project Developer’s 
Vision 
Capture CO at the gasification plant in Pernis, which produces hydrogen from oil refinery heavy residues.  The 
CO is transported for 17 km in existing low pressure pipeline, injecting 300,000 to 400,000 t CO/year into 
depleted gas fields.  The first of two fields is under Barendrecht and a neighbouring town with a 3 year capacity at 
1,700m depth; the second is under Barendrecht, with a 20 year capacity and at 2,700 m depth.  This would be one of 
two demonstration CCS projects in the Netherlands, each attracting 130m subsidy.  The other project is in Geleen. 
Story In 2007 Shell started with small scale, low key one on one engagements with local stakeholders (e.g. representatives 
of local welfare organisations, shop owners); they found no signs of opposition.  The first larger scale presentation 
to a general audience was in February 2008 which generated little public debate. After an initial presentation to the 
Municipal council in early 2008, Shell conducted a second public information meeting in April 2008 further 
explaining and announcing the project.  Some concerns about safety and why the project was located where it was 
were raised by both the municipal council and by the public.  These concerns took a long time to address, in some 
cases up to a year.  These delays were viewed as obfuscation and suspicious by some media reports and 
commentators, although Shell state the delays were because they desired to follow the standard procedures 
concerning EIA’s in the Netherlands.  National government endorsement arrived too late in November 2008 to be 
of much use.  In the mean time negative media reporting and local political opposition quickly snowballed.  Shell 
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provided technical information and dismissed continued concerns as ‘irrational’ or ‘emotional’.  Despite various 
independent sources of information and independent assessments, damage to Shell’s credibility had been done and 
the municipality’s position had become entrenched.  They rejected the project in May 2009.  In November 2009 the 
national government overturned this decision.  In December 2009 strong public opposition to the project was voiced 
on the grounds of undemocratic decision making. In November 2010 the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Innovation announced the decision to cancel the project. The delay of the CO2 storage project for 
more than 3 years and the complete lack of local support were given as the main reasons to stop. 
Stakeholders involved  Project developers (Shell, NAM, OCAP) – seek to promote project.   
TOC – research organization providing underground expertise.  Supported project. (Also called TNO) 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning – implicit support, but officially 
endorsed project, 1.5 years after project was announced.  Eventually overruled the municipality’s rejection of 
project. 
Environmental Protection Agency of Rijnmond. An organisation with three different roles: 1. Permitting agency 2. 
Consulting agency for local governments 3. Supporter of CCS via Rotterdam Climate Initiative 
Provincial Executive, Provincial Council – unformed position, willing to engage in debate. 
Municipalities of Barendrecht – strongly against, have led the opposition. 
Municipality of Albrandswaard – officially support municipality of Barendrecht, but little action. 
Environmental Protection Agency of Rijnmond 
Public of Barendrecht – seemingly against (e.g.  900 signed petition, 300-400 marched, >600 opposed in final 
public meeting), although no survey work has been done. 
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Media, national and local – served to further polarise stakeholder positions 
National NGOs (Greenpeace, SNM) – have stayed out of the debate. 
Independent scientists – those who opposed to the project have received a lot of attention. 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Engagement with municipal council was slow to respond to their concerns.  Two public meeting raised many public 
concerns.  Concerns regarding risk perception and long term liability were never dealt with adequately and from 
this point on the municipal and public support were never recovered.  The choice of Barendrecht as a location also 
remained poorly understood, and there was a perception that the community were being ‘experimented upon’. 
The media amplified this problem with negative and reporting often not based upon scientific opinion.  Despite 
attempts by Shell and by national government to ensure independent information and expert advice, their efforts 
were perceived as partisan.  Government communication regarding onshore CCS came late into the project and as 
such was not much help. 
The information centre did not prove popular, perhaps due to lack of involvement from all stakeholders, and 
perhaps because the centre opened over a year after the initial controversy over the project. 
At the second public meeting (180 participants) there was agreement that the municipal council could speak for the 
public on this issue.  However this should not account for the lack of timely public engagement from Shell, which 
was compounded by the lack of timely support from state or national government.   
By far the strongest public outcry was when the municipality’s decision to deny the project was overturned by the 
national government.  The relevant ministers held a public meeting and were roundly booed, and strong opposition 
on account of the undemocratic decision making process was avowed. 
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Location analysis Barendrecht is a town of 44,000 people, in west Netherlands, close to Rotterdam and to the Rijmond industrial area, 
the largest in the Netherlands.  Barendrecht is however an area popular with middle class families and house prices 
are high. 
The town has recently been hemmed in on two sides by a large motorway, a high speed train line, and a freight rail 
line, all possibly contributing to public discontent about increasing development (development fatigue). 
Outcome in terms of 
project developer’s aim 
In November 2010 the Dutch Ministery of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation announced the decision to 
cancel the project. The delay of the CO2 storage project for more than 3 years and the complete lack of local 
support were given as the main reasons to stop. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
The local municipality, and seemingly the local public, strongly rejected the project, but were overruled by the 
national government.  This is likely to cause long lasting resentment. 
Local, national and international reporting of the resistance to the project may have negative repercussions on future 
developments. 
Lessons Early impressions are very important for building trust.  Once a lack of trust has been established it is very difficult 
to regain it, for example independent information will be viewed as partisan.   
Public or stakeholder meetings should not be entered into without initial preparation (e.g.  focus groups or available 
information on risks etc.) and necessary information ready and to hand.   
Technical explanation of risk is not sufficient – although public/stakeholder concerns may be emotional or social in 
origin that does not make them invalid.   
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There may have been other factors influencing the community’s desire to object – for example, although there were 
objections in Albrandword and Geleen they were less pronounced.  
It was never evident to some stakeholders opposed to the project why this site was chosen compared to other sites. 
Shell assumed a level of knowledge about climate change and energy security which was not shared by the publics. 
Some external factors amplified problems, often quoting inaccurate information: NAME (Not According to My 
Expert), media, individual ‘crusaders’.   
Some use of diagrams such as maps showing storage sites overlaid on the town (showing people’s houses) and a 
diagram showing CO stored approximately 3 tree lengths below the surface caused concerns. 
Detailed Summary 2006 Shell began preparations for the Brendrecht project 
2007 Shell approached council 
2007 Shell approached municipality and conducted small scale, low key stakeholder engagements. 
2008 Shell presented plans to council 
February 2008 First public meeting – 60 participants.  Little debate. 
One week later Shell updated the council, was asked for all supporting documentation pertaining to EIA but took 
one year to deliver as this information was to be prepared for the EIA. Although the council was fully involved in 
drafting the EIA, the relevant information did not reach the dissatisfied parties.  
February 2008 National newspaper article “Not under my backyard” 
April 2008 Second public meeting – 180 participants, huge amount of debate. 
Mid 2008, National, provincial and municipal government stakeholders formed a discussion platform (called 
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BCO), and a communication workgroup was created with all stakeholder invited. 
June 2008 the municipal council agreed to speak with one voice on the subject, but the green/left party (Groenlinks) 
organised a march and petition against the project. 
October 2008 meeting in Albrandswaard, with little opposition. 
November 2008 130m subsidy delivered (1.5 years late), along with official government endorsement. 
January - March 2009 BCO compiled a question checklist the municipality wanted answered, and organised four 
independent expert meetings discussing the environmental impact assessment.  All of the checklist questions were 
answered, but not all to the satisfaction of the municipality. 
During this period municipal political parties continued active opposition and three national newspapers and one 
magazine negatively reported the project. 
February 2008 BCO organised a public meeting with 1000 attendees.  Shell lost credibility by claiming that the 
project was not profitable and that they would take into account public opposition.  Neither of these sentiments were 
believed. 
March 2009 An independent website offering neutral information on climate change and CCS was launched by 
MileuCentraal (www.co2afvangenopslag.nl) but was considered to be Shell propaganda. 
March 2009 A project information centre was opened in Brendrecht, funded by national government with 
contributions from Shell, and designed to be neutral and independent with all stakeholders invited to participate.  
However NGOs, the local municipality and local political parties refused to take part leading to public perceptions 
of bias.  The visitor centre attracted approximately 7 visits per day. 
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April 2009 The ‘national coordination regulation’ was passed, meaning that final decision for the project lay with 
the national government. 
May 2009 Shell and NAM gave lectures and Rotary and Lions clubs, and organized two public excursions to 
injection sites.  The excursions were poorly attended and reported in a local newspaper as telling only ‘half the 
truth’. 
27
th
 May 2009 the municipal executive board took the decisions to decline the project.   
9
th
 June 2009 the municipal council reconfirmed its decision to refuse the project. 
September 2009 ‘CO is nee’a citizen action group was formed.
18
th
 November 2009 National government ministers announced decision to overrule the municipal decision, stating 
that the project was safe and necessary. 
December 2009 Both the ministers who took the decision to go ahead with the project visited Barendrecht to 
explain their decision.  A local theatre was filled to capacity with 600 people and more watched on televised screens 
at the town hall.  The entire audience was strongly opposed, interrupted the Ministers and delivered well received 
speeches stating that the decision made was undemocratic and the project would not be allowed to continue. 
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Case Study  Carson, California, USA 
Type of project CCS (onshore) and Hydrogen power station from petroleum coke. 
Developer HECA (Hydrogen Energy California) – a joint venture between BP and Rio Tinto 
Project Developer’s Vision Industrial scale demonstration project, 500 MW, 4 Mt CO/year for EOR.  Project costs $1bn.  Will provide  
Planned to start 2011.  Plan to inject CO at the Wilmington oil field. 
Story There was local resistance to the project citing health and safety risks in a densely populated area, including the 
explosion of hydrogen stored on site and the leaking of CO into the Los Angeles valley with its notorious smog 
problems.  The opponents did not believe that the safety concerns had been properly investigated or that the 
developers were capable to ensure the safety, citing a fire at a previous BP site. 
The developers cited ‘geological reasons’ for deciding not to inject CO in the Wilmington oil field. 
HECA decided to move the whole project to Kern County, and the storage site to the Elk Hills oilfield.  This 
decision has set back the project by four years, which aims to complete permitting by 2011 and begin full 
operation by 2016.   
Stakeholders involved  HECA – developer 
Wilmington Coalition for a Safe Environment – the plant posed a health and safety risk in a heavily populated 
area. 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
January 2010 Early engagement is currently under way in Kern County, including a first public meeting of 100 
people organised by the (independent) California Energy Commission. 
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A visitor centre was opened, and HECA donated $20,000 to various local good causes to demonstrate its 
commitment to the community.  Job creation is stressed.   
Location analysis Although the original Carson site was on brownfield land, it is an urban area, and the Wilmington oil field is 
under very densely populated areas of Los Angeles. 
Buttonwillow, Kern County, is an agricultural area with low population density.   
Outcome in terms of project 
developer’s aim 
The project is still going ahead, although three to four years behind schedule.   
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
Although the project was cancelled in its original location and there was a popular opposition campaign, it does 
not seem to have developed into a full blown anti-CCS movement. 
Lessons The social fit with site selection appears to be better second time around.   
By cancelling the Carson site, HECA avoided a high profile battle which could have tarnished the reputation of 
the development.  It is strange, however, that the developers did not openly acknowledge the opponents role in 
their decision to move elsewhere.   
Detailed Summary  
 
  
 
117 
 
Case Study  FutureGen 
Type of project CCS and hydrogen from coal at the commercial scale 
Developer Futuregen Alliance 
Project Developer’s Vision A public-private partnership to build the first commercial scale CCS coal fired power plant (also using a 275 
MW integrated gas combined cycle (IGCC) system).  The plant will also produce hydrogen and by-products for 
possible use by other industries.  Planned sequestration of 1 Mt CO/year for four years.  Cost $1.8dn, 74% of 
which from US Department of Energy (DOE), with plans to recoup costs by selling experience to other national 
governments.  Full scale operation planned to begin in 2012. 
Story Following initial excitement from the political figures and publics of Mattoon, Illinois in 2007 the project was 
put on hold while the USDOE pulled out of the project and Futuregen Alliance searched for new partners.  This 
prompted accusations from Illinois actors that the USDOE had vested interests in Texas and that was the real 
reason for the pull out.   
Whilst it now looks like the USDOE will re-join the project, a final decision has not been made but is expected 
by April 2010.  Political and council figures in Mattoon are impatient to go ahead with the project and there is 
some evidence that the publics are doubting that the project will occur.   
Stakeholders involved  Futuregen Alliance 
USDOE 
Municipality of Mattoon 
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Public of Mattoon (initially very strong support) 
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Friends of the Mountains – interest groups opposed to coal mining. 
A local newspaper, the Journal-Gazette Times-Courier, has been supportive of the project and is proud to have 
world leading technology in their area.   
Engagement and 
communication processes 
National competition launched to ‘win’ the development in a community. 
Website and factsheets created.  >200 informal stakeholder meetings across the four finalist communities before 
holding public meetings – 84 in Mattoon.  Main interests were in jobs, origin of coal (local preferred), water 
implications (farmers especially), cost of power and a visitor centre.  Some concern over long term monitoring 
and liability. 
The following public meetings went smoothly as a result of the preceding informal meetings, as difficult 
questions had already been raised and the early engagement helped to build trust.   
Emphasis was put on the novel nature of the whole technology chain, not just the CCS element.  The media 
praise the FutureGen selection process as scientific and transparent.   
Location analysis Coal has been an important part of the Illinois economy and there is a certain amount of pride in this project as it 
is seen as world leading and an opportunity for job and skill development.   
Outcome in terms of project 
developer’s aim 
The project was supported strongly, but it is still unclear if the project will go ahead because of funding troubles. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
The engagement process, and possibly the self selecting competition aspect, led to strong public support for the 
project.  
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engagement 
Lessons Launching the project as a competition may have encouraged communities to accept the project and led to 
finding locations with a good social fit as well as geological fit. 
Early informal stakeholder meetings allowed difficult questions to be asked early on  and contributed to trust 
levels, so that public meetings ran more smoothly. 
The delaying of construction has been damaging to Illinois stakeholder trust in USDOE and may lead to 
increased suspicion about the project in general. 
Detailed Summary 2003 The project was announced and a competition launched to find the right host community.   
December 2007 Mattoon Township, Coles County, Illinois was chosen from a shortlist of four (in Illinois and 
Texas).  A state law was passed giving Illinois the long term liability for the gases below ground.   
A study by Southern Illinois University showed there would be 1,300 ‘direct jobs’ and 3,250 ‘indirect jobs’ from 
construction of the FutureGen plant on about 600 acres west of Mattoon. 
January 2008 USDOE pulled its funding from the project, citing increasing costs, but prompting accusations 
that the DOE had vested interests in Texas and would not allow the project to go ahead because it had been 
located in Illinois.  The Futuregen alliance decided to go ahead with the project, searching for other sources of 
funding, and attempting to bring DOE back.   
Throughout 2008 and 2009 efforts were made to regain DOE funding and following the election of Obama this 
began to look increasingly likely. 
March 2009 auditors determined the DOE had calculated the costs wrong, overestimating by $0.5bn. 
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July 2009 A ‘record of decision’ was released by the USDOE promising support for Futuregen.   
A final decision is expected in spring 2010, whilst the project has been delayed by 18 months.   
March 2010 An online poll at the Journal-Gazette Times-Courier shows that 48% of people believe the project 
will be delayed again and 44% believe that it will never happen.  The public may be losing faith in the process. 
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Case Study  Greenville, Darke County, Ohio 
Type of project Corn ethanol  
Developer Battelle, The Andersons Marathon Ethanol LLC,  
Project Developer’s Vision Part of the Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership, the aim was to capture 1 million tons of COover 
four years from a corn ethanol plant and store it in a saline aquifer at 1,000m depth.  This was part of a series of 
projects (the regional partnerships) to demonstrate the full CCS chain at large scale. 
Total cost $93m, USDOE to front $62m. 
Story Six months after the first public information meeting about the project, a citizens group called ‘Citizens Against 
CO Sequestration’ formed of a dozen people.  Their objections centred around perceived threats to their safety and 
the notion that they were being experimented upon and taken advantage of. 
The citizens group gained popular, political and local media support and by August 2009 the project developers 
announced they would not go ahead with the project, citing ‘economic considerations’.  The project was still in an 
early stage, and regulatory permits had not yet been applied for. 
There are early reports of opposition movements in the neighbouring county of Indiana against as-yet-unconfirmed 
CCS plans.  One of the opposition groups (Citizens Action Coalition) helped Citizens Against CO Sequestration 
organise.  This is an example of how opposition may spread, and groups mutually reinforce each other.   
Stakeholders involved  Battelle – developing the project.  Judith Bradbury worked on communications. 
Andersons Marathon ethanol plant – willing to go ahead once convinced by safety of project.  Andersons Marathon 
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were new to the area and may have been greeted with suspicion. 
Citizens Against CO Sequestration – their views on CCS may be summarised from their website: “Unproven 
technology, ridiculous risk, exorbitant cost”.  An influential critical group who united the community in opposition 
to the project. 
Darke Journal – views climate change as ‘sloppy pseudo science’, and CCS as the same. 
Other local media are critical of the project, but not in such extreme terms. 
Mike Bowers, mayor of Greenville – initially trusting of Battelle’s competence, but later against this and other 
CCS projects. 
State representative Jim Zehringer ‘bitterly against’ project. 
Other influential locals opposed include a state civil engineer and a municipal judge.   
“I have rarely seen a community that well organized and that strong,” said Nolan Moser of the Ohio Environmental 
Council, which supports the project.   
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency – approved the project. 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
It has been difficult to find full details of the engagement process, although it is stated that continued and coherent 
outreach activities were conducted, involving stakeholder research, formation of an outreach team, message and 
materials development, proactive/targeted engagement, and a response/feedback process. 
Two focus groups were conducted in Columbus, Ohio and yielded information highly relevant to the case in 
Greenville – namely that lack of trust in government or industry to keep the population safe was the prevailing 
factor. 
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One public information event was held in August 2008. 
A number of informal meetings were conducted. 
May 2009 Battelle & MRPCS brochures on display in pubic library (source: citizens against co2 seq)  
MRCSP produced plenty of text heavy but readable documents explaining different points (e.g.  climate change, 
geological sequestration, likelihood of seismic activity).   
Citizens against CO Sequestration are critical of attempts to engage public, viewing it as manipulative. 
Location analysis The public opinion in this town appears to be that climate change does not exist, and therefore the rationale for 
CCS does not exist.   
There is a strong sense that federal governments and corporations take advantage of people such as themselves, and 
that if CCS was a good thing it would be done ‘under the state capital’. 
The regions only water supply is from a sole-source aquifer, fuelling concerns that if the aquifer were to become 
‘contaminated’ there would be no safe water. 
There was no history of oil or gas exploration in the area. 
Outcome in terms of 
project developer’s aim 
The project was called off before the regulatory phase was completed. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
Citizens against CO sequestration now enthusiastically support any other CCS protests around the world. 
Any CCS development (or EOR) in Darke county may now be very difficult to undertake. There are initial signs 
that opposition has spread to CCS projects in neighbouring states. 
Lessons The lack of belief in the science behind climate change or the science of CCS, coupled with the lack of trust in 
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government and industry led to very strong opposition. 
The belief that the population was being experimented upon was problematic. 
The concerns about ground water contamination, and increased earthquakes could not be placated by scientists, 
because the community did not have any faith in scientists. 
Initial social survey work may have highlighted these potentially insurmountable issues. 
 
Difficult to draw lessons about engagement techniques used as little information on what was used has been 
available, although it was said by Bradbury to be thorough. 
Detailed Summary 2007 Preliminary briefings on the project between Battelle, Darke County and Greenville officials 
6 May 2007 Project announced to public (Battelle already on board) 
13 Aug 08 Public meeting (Battelle organised) 
March 2009 : Citizens against co2 sequestration are formed, and develop arguments against CCS project, such as 
safety, risks, being experimented upon, distrust of energy companies, feeling of being taken advantage of by 
powerful (government, industry), CO reductions possible in other ways, waste of tax payer dollars, ground water 
contamination, inconvenience (e.g.  road closures), who assumes long term liability, seismic testing using 
explosives, potential for causing earthquakes, potential decrease in property values, lack of future economic 
development as may be perceived as an experimental zone, safety of supercritical CO, Other pollutants resulting 
from increased coal burning a concern.  Express discontent about lack of publicity for planning meetings, 
discussion of job opportunities and lack of transparent decision making.  Do not appreciate public perceptions, 
  
 
125 
literature on CCS viewed as schmooze, scam or manipulative.  Take offence to CCS in less densely populated 
areas ‘our lives are less important?’ 
June 2009 several dozen people march and promote campaign. 
June 2009 Ohio EPA approve project 
June 2009 “No drilling in Darke County” yard signs (900 up by August) 
July 2009 Protest meeting, 700 - 1,000 attendees.  Speakers include Municipal court member, Country civil 
engineer as well as Citizen action groups and green action groups.   
July 2009 (test) Drilling to begin 
July 2009 Darke county journal poll shows 97% opposition to CCS in county.  (387 respondees via internet).  
Advocate poll showed that 74% thought the project was dangerous, 65% thought it was not a good idea and 73% 
thought there should be a public vote on the topic. 
July 2009 – House hearing on water safety.  Various expert witnesses assured safety, but those opposed to scheme 
were not convinced. 
4 August 2009 – County commissioners formally ask project developers to stop project. 
11 Aug 2009 – At council meeting, all councillors put on spot and asked for personal opinion on project.  It appears 
there was mostly either denouncement of the project or no opinion given, but no support. 
12 Aug 2009 – Faith into action meeting -400 people prayed together against the project. 
15 Aug 2009 State representative Jim Zehringer opposes project 
15 Aug 2009 – Neighbouring village of Arcanum, Ohio start their own chapter of citizens against co2 seq 
20 Aug 2009 – Battelle announce that they will not go ahead with the project. 
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Little action on blog following, some articles criticising CCS, one doubting relationship between CO and climatic 
temperature increase. 
19 Sept 2009 – Battelle apply for permits in another area of Darke county for EOR project, blog greets them with 
suspicion. 
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Case Study  Ketzin, Germany 
Type of project CCS pilot 
Developer The German Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ); operated by Verbuntz Gas (VNG) 
Project Developer’s 
Vision 
Also called the COSINK project, this is a scientific research project to gather further information about CO 
storage, funded by the EU Commission, the German government and industry partners.  The aim is to sequester 
60,000 t CO 
Story Research into CO2 storage has been conducted in Brandenburg in Ketzin, near Potsdam, since 2004.  It is primarily 
a research operation by the GFZ, and is operated by VNG.  Eighteen industrial partners and scientific institutions 
from nine European countries are involved in the EU-sponsored project COSINK.  Vattenfall is one of the industry 
partners.  Since the summer of 2008, CO2 has been injected into a saline aquifer in Ketzin, Brandenburg with no 
public opposition.   
Stakeholders involved  GFZ/VNG 
Mayor of Ketzin 
Public of Ketzin 
Local and National Media 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Although not required by law, the local council and local public were informed of the project through a series of 
presentations and site visits, right from the start.   
Media reports have all been positive. 
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Local council and publics profess to be satisfied with the level of information received. 
Local publics state that because it is a research project there are no vested interests and so the information they 
receive is unbiased.   
Location analysis Like Schwarze Pumpe, Beeskow and Neutribbin, Ketzin is also located in Brandenberg.  In contrast to Beeskow or 
Neutribbin, Ketzin has a long history with the gas industry; and despite a leak which occurred in the 1960s (people 
had to be permanently relocated) there is a good level of local public and political trust in the gas industry in 
general.   
Outcome in terms of 
project developer’s aim 
The project has gone ahead as planned. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
All stakeholders appear satisfied with the outcomes, and media coverage has been positive. 
Lessons A clear and early engagement policy with local authorities and publics. 
Social fit with the area – an existing history of natural gas industries. 
High trust in scientific research institutions helps public groups believe the information regarding the project. 
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Case Study  Lacq, France 
Type of project CCS, oxyfuel. 
Developer Total, with Air Liquide, French Petroleum Institute (IFP), the French Bureau of Geological and Mining Research 
(BRGM), and Alstom. 
Project Developer’s Vision Europe’s first end-to-end carbon capture, transportation and storage demonstration facility began injecting CO 
in January 2010, one year behind schedule.  The 35 MW oxyfuel boiler will capture and store 75,000 t 
CO per year over a two year period.  The CO is pumped through an existing 27 km low pressure pipeline to the 
Rousse gas field where it is sequestered at 4,500 m depth. 
Goals for the project are to increase knowledge of the oxyfuel process, reduce the costs and demonstrate the 
larger scale reliability of CCS. 
Story The project went ahead as planned, with an engagement strategy integrated into the technical and regulatory 
project activities leading to public support for the project.  Much has been made of this as an example of a 
successful stakeholder engagement strategy leading to public acceptance.  Whilst the engagement process was 
well run and well planned from the start, there are also other factors which helped lead to the success of the 
project (the ‘social fit’) and some criticisms to make of the engagement process.   
Stakeholders involved  Total and other developers 
The Lacq public 
Local NGOs – e.g.  France Nature Environment  
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Independent associations – e.g.  the French Petroleum Institute  
French Environment and Energy management Agency 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Total recognised early on that transparency and trust levels were important in stakeholder approval, and 
accordingly published a consultation charter stating their intentions for the consultations.  Total committed to 
transparency, to answer every question asked (and anticipated that every question would be asked), and to take 
into account stakeholder concerns. 
 
Early informal engagement with approximately40 local people prepared for the later public meetings (>300 
attendees).  Involvement and support from independent groups (local NGOs, experts and government agency) 
was useful in establishing the credibility of the information.  High ranking employees of Total attended the 
meetings, which also added to the sense that the public were taken seriously.  Total state that all participants in 
the final (project) decision must take place in all public dialogue events. 
High quality printed resources, maps and diagrams, were produced, as well as a 3-D model demonstrating how 
the facility would operate.   
 
Despite Total’s successful engagement campaign, only 32% of people surveyed believed they had received 
enough information, and 51% thought that it was still necessary to negotiate on the conditions of the pilot plant.  
Although 40% of people knew about the public meetings, only 13% of people attended.  This implies that 
although the engagement was of good quality, if it had run over a longer time period perhaps more people could 
have taken part. 
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Location analysis The region has the most underground gas fields in France and as such is both used to this type of industry and 
reliant upon it for the local economy.  The industry has been successfully operating in the area for over 50 years.  
These factors help to increase local trust levels in industry and government regulation, as well as imply a fit with 
the local place identity. 
Outcome in terms of project 
developer’s aim 
The project went ahead, supported by most stakeholders. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
The engagement process worked very well, with most stakeholders supporting the project and feeling that their 
questions had been answered satisfactorily.   
Lessons A consultation charter setting out intentions, a well planned strategy, high levels of transparency, early informal 
engagement with key stakeholders, and public meetings attended by independent parties as well as high ranking 
employees of Total all contributed to this successful engagement campaign. 
Willingness to answer all questions and address all problems enhanced trust levels, and although the project was 
delayed by one year the delay could have been much longer and the outcomes much worse had problems not 
been dealt with. 
Public meetings held over a longer time period may have allowed more people to attend. 
The social fit with the site was favourable – people were familiar with the type of industry, the project developer 
and the regulatory systems in place.   
Detailed Summary 2006 – Preliminary Studies  
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December 2006 – Project Approved by French Government 
February 2007 – Project Announced to public 
June – September 2007 – Meetings with 40 key local people 
November 2007 – Outreach campaign began with print, web and three public meetings 
April 2008 onwards – The CLIS formed and met regularly.  The CLIS (Local information and surveillance 
commission) is a board with legal powers to ask the developer to provide further evidence or investigations on 
certain topics, and makes public their independent assessment of the project.  The board was made up of  made 
up of 4 state representatives, 9 locally elected, 2 from unions, 4 from associations, 5 experts and 4 from Total.   
July to September 2008 – Survey of public opinions regarding the project and the outreach activities. 
May 2009 – The project received authorization to go ahead. 
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Case Study  Peterhead, Scotland 
Type of project CCS, pre-combustion, EOR, offshore 
Developer BP, Scottish & Southern Energy 
Project Developer’s Vision Extract CO from gas landed at St Fergus terminal, pump CO 240 km back out to the Miller oil field where it 
could be used for enhanced oil recovery, as well as long term sequestration.  Costing £500m, the project could 
have been running by the end of 2009.   
Story The Miller oil field was nearing the end of its useful life and was not economical to keep open without the EOR 
project.  When the UK government announced that the competition to win CCS funding would be launched in 
November 2007, BP decided that the timescale was too long, and pulled out of the project.  Despite this, 
engagement and consultations with local stakeholders had taken place during the pre-planning phase.  The 
response had been overwhelmingly positive, and many were disappointed when the project was cancelled.  The 
Scottish First minister, Alex Salmond, angrily criticised the UK government for acting too slowly.  The project 
was announced in June 2005 and cancelled in May 2007. 
Stakeholders involved (and 
expectation) 
BP, Scottish & Southern Energy (project would be valuable) 
Scottish Government (project would bring income and world leading technology) 
UK Government (the best project should be picked in a considered way) 
Local Authority (the project would bring jobs) 
Community Councils (the project would bring jobs) 
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Local publics (the project would bring jobs) 
Media (the project would bring jobs and world leading technology) 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Consultations had occurred between members of the local authority, representatives of community councils and 
the general public, and other interested parties.  These consultations were generally meetings of 20-30 people, 
and allowed discussion and questioning of the project developers.  The local media portrayed the project in a 
positive light, and high level Scottish Government advocacy may have raised the profile and added to the 
credibility of the project.   
There was very little criticism or scepticism however, which was put down to the long running relationship 
between Scottish & Southern and the local community – Peterhead power station has been operating safely and 
providing employing for over 30 years.  The visual and physical extensions to the site were minimal, and the 
storage site was offshore.  Stakeholders expressed curiosity about the storage element, but not misgivings.  The 
main benefit was perceived as increased employment, and lengthening the economic life of the oilfield.   
Location analysis Peterhead is a small town in a fairly remote region whose main income is through the oil business, part of which 
was threatening closure and could have been extended by the EOR element of this project.  Relationships with 
the developer were good, having been built up over a 30 year period.   
Outcome in terms of project 
developer’s aim 
The project was cancelled, because of a lack of external funding. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
The stakeholders were keen for the project to go ahead. 
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engagement 
Lessons High trust in the developer led to minimum of local concerns. 
Economic opportunities were perceived as a key local benefit. 
Despite public support and a viable project, external forces made the project impossible. 
Detailed Summary  
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Case Study  Schwarze Pumpe, Germany 
Type of project CCS on shore pilot, oxyfuel coal fire power station 
Developer Vattenfall 
Project Developer’s 
Vision 
Use the knowledge gained from the 30 MW pilot plant to build a demonstration plant (10 times larger) and to 
validate the whole chain technically and economically, as well as to boost public confidence in the technology.  
Vattenfall have a long term strategy to develop CCS. 
Inject the CO into the Altmark gas field, enhanced gas recovery (EGR), 100,000 t CO to be injected over 3 years 
(2010-2012) at 3000 m depth.  CO transport by truck.  The next phase of the project plans to inject CO into the 
Neutrebbin and Beeskow gas fields.   
Want to increase local trust and develop models for co-ownership. 
Story Pilot plant built 2007, began operation mid 2008. 
September 2008 Project officially launched  
March-April 2009 – planned beginning of injection of CObut this did not occur because of hold ups in the 
permitting process due to public concerns over safety. 
Permits may be obtained by Spring 2010. 
Explorations of the Neutribbin and Beeskow gas fields for the next phase (the much larger demonstration) have met 
strong opposition from local publics and from local politicians. 
Stakeholders involved  Vattenfall – project developer.   
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German national government – decisions are made at national level for these types of projects. 
Spremberg council – good relationship with Vattenfall 
Spremberg public – good relationship with Vattenfall 
Altmark, Neutribbin and Beeskow publics – concerned about safety of CO sequestration 
Environmental NGOs – opposed to CCS on the grounds that it is a fig leaf for fossil fuel consumption and renewable 
energy is a better option. 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Very little communication or engagement was performed for construction of the oxyfuel plant, manager was 
confident public would learn everything they needed to from the media.  Communication with municipal council is 
very low as well, but neither sees this as a problem as decisions are made at national level. 
ENGOs also communicate via the media, receiving adequate attention. 
It has not been possible to obtain information about Vattenfall’s outreach campaign at the storage site, but a higher 
level of engagement than in Spremberg would have been necessary.  Indeed the manager stated that regarding 
storage "People are very, very sceptical." 
In Beeskow public groups and local politicians of every party are opposed to storage, believing leakage inevitable 
and possibly dangerous to human health or groundwater.  The opposition groups would prefer information to come 
from independent scientists rather than from Vattenfall, who has is perceived as having a vested interest in 
convincing the public to permit the process.  Trust in Vattenfall and in the authorities who grant permits is low.   
Location analysis Spremberg, the location of the oxyfuel plant permitted the development.  The storage of CO under the Altmark 
gasfield has not (yet) been permited due to local public resistance. 
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Spremberg requires employment, and is used to the large Schwarze Pumpe development, therefore neither the 
council nor the public were concerned about the oxyfuel plant.   
Outcome in terms of 
project developer’s aim 
The oxyfuel plant was built on schedule, and is now operating.   
The storage component of the study has not yet gone ahead, and is at present delayed by public opposition. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
The low level of engagement and communication when building the oxyfuel plant satisfied all stakeholders, perhaps 
because of the high trust levels and familiarity with the type of development. 
The level of engagement at the storage site is unknown, although after the public protest, Vattenfall sees public 
acceptance as a major topic for their work.   
Lessons In the construction of the oxyfuel plant, there was little communication or engagement, but a high level of trust in 
project developer.  This led to satisfactory outcomes for all parties (except ENGOs, who oppose all CCS projects) 
The storage element was far more contentious, and resulted in delays which are as yet unresolved.  Exploration for 
large scale storage in Beeskow or Neutribbin has met strong opposition. 
The German system whereby local authorities are involved very little in decisions for this type of project may lead to 
decreased levels of trust where there is not already an established industry. 
Detailed Summary  
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Case Study  Weyburn-Midale, Saskatchewan, Canada  
Type of project CCS on shore storage demonstration  
Developer Petroleum Technology Research Centre, supported by a consortium of industry and government partners.   
Project Developer’s Vision A large scale research project integrated into an existing EOR project, launched in 2000, first phase 2000-2004, 
final phase 2005-2011.  1million t/yr CO stored.  330km pipeline runs from the Beulah Dakota Gasification 
plant to Cenovus' Weyburn and Apache’s Midale oilfields.  An EOR project operates at Midale, into which the 
first phase of the research project was integrated.  The goal of the project is to test predictions of the reservoir to 
sequester CO both safely and economically, producing a very thorough dataset for scrutiny.  In previous EOR 
projects, the fate of the CO has not been studied as a desired outcome.  The project cost is $80m. 
Story It has been impossible to find any details of the engagement process entered into by Petroleum Technology 
Research Centre (PTRC) and other developers.   
Stakeholders involved   
Engagement and 
communication processes 
There has been little research on public outreach, as this is planned in phase 2.  Phase 1 focused more on the 
technical side of the project; phase 2 aims to also do work on public outreach, regulation and business models.  
Two surveys have been conducted (in Toronto and Edmonton) to assess public attitudes to CCS. 
Location analysis Weyburn itself has population of 9,500 over 15 km2.  Saskatchewan has a very low population density of 1.6 
inhabitants per km2 (compared to 400 people per km2 in Holland).  This implies a very different type of outreach 
strategy – in the case of Weyburn it seems that almost no outreach was done. 
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The Weyburn oilfield covers 70 sq miles 
Outcome in terms of project 
developer’s aim 
The project has been going on successfully, and is set to continue with no signs of opposition. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
There have been no records of opposition. The area in is however very remote. 
Lessons A number of implications may be drawn as to why the project succeeded, but cannot substantiated and as such 
are speculative. 
That there are very few people living in the area makes communication and engagement simpler. 
The area has a history of oil extraction, and this project sets up to continue that industry. 
Detailed Summary  
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Case Study  Gateway, Rampside, Cumbria, England  
Type of project Offshore Gas Storage 
Developer Gateway, Stag Energy 
Project Developer’s Vision Gateway Storage Company Ltd plans to build an underground natural gas storage facility at 1 km depth in the 
East Irish Sea, approximately 25 km offshore, south west of Barrow-in-Furness.  Storage caverns will be 
developed in a natural salt structure below the seabed, and be fed by an onshore gas compression station.  The 
caverns will have a working capacity of 1.512 billion standard cubic meters adding nearly 30% to the current gas 
storage capacity in the UK.  Construction is planned to commence 2010 and operation in 2015. 
Story Gateway gas storage consulted widely before making planning requests, and resolved local concerns about 
noise, visual impact and traffic issues, as well as about safety.  Fishermen were the least satisfied group, but 
willing to accept some compensation for lost business.  The region has plans to become “Britain’s Energy 
Coast”, and the Gateway project was at the start of this scheme.  All local and national planning applications 
went well, and construction will soon begin. 
Stakeholders involved  Gateway and Stag (project will be safe and provide benefits) 
Local publics (concerns included noise, visual impact, traffic and safety, but where mostly allayed by exhibitions 
and discussions) 
Local fishermen (that they will lose fishing grounds) 
Local Authority (good economic opportunity) 
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Regional Fishing organisations (that local small scale fishermen may be adversely affected) 
Marine and Bird conservation organisations (satisfied that impacts will be minimal) 
DECC (satisfied that issues have been satisfactorily dealt with) 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Gateway has an avowed “philosophy of open communication” and are “wholly committed to wider public 
consultation”.  This seems to have been followed in practice by early engagement with a wide range of 
organisations and councils, and pre-planning application seminars, discussions and exhibitions for local publics. 
Gateway have proactively engaged with the local media, mostly to positive results.  The director of the company 
has taken an active role in engagement.  Media has mostly focused on the employment opportunities, and the 
satisfactory level of public engagement provided by gateway. 
Location analysis The onshore element compression station is situated near to Barrow-in-Furness, an industrial coastal town which 
specialised in ship and submarine building.  The compression station itself is situated next to an existing 
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) terminal.  The pipeline then runs through a bay and straight out to sea. 
Five offshore wind farms are proposed for the area, however, none have yet been constructed so the locals have 
not had a chance to feel ‘hemmed in’ by new developments (if indeed they ever do). 
The offshore elements are not expected to seriously impact fishing or shipping activities.  A further two gas 
storage projects have been proposed, and local residents are showing signs of development fatigue.   
Outcome in terms of project 
developer’s aim 
The project is going ahead as desired by the developer, with minimum delays. 
Outcome in terms of It seems that all stakeholders were satisfied with the engagement process, with only the unresolved matter of 
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communication and 
engagement 
compensation requests from five local fishermen. 
The tone of acceptance may change if two more gas storage projects are built, five offshore wind farms and 
increased LNG capacity. 
Lessons The offshore storage was much less contentious than onshore, although fishermen and marine conservation must 
be considered.   
A good social fit led to a good project, in an area with industrial and fossil fuel history, with minimum 
interference to local activities.   
The project came before a flurry of other energy projects, of which residents are now become weary.   
Early and wide consultation, as well as active involvement from senior staff helped allay public concerns.   
Detailed Summary April 2005 – Initial consultations with organisations and authorities on the proposed project. 
February 2006 – A press release announces the project.   
October 2007 – Public exhibitions and discussions. 
Late October 2007 – Gateway begin the process of applying for planning permission from DECC. 
May 2008 – Further public exhibitions 
June 2008 – Local planning approval for onshore compression station. 
November 2008 – planning permission granted from DECC. 
February 2010 – Gateway secure gas storage licence.   
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Case Study  Milford Haven to Gloucester Gas Pipeline 
Type of project Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Pipeline 
Developer National Grid 
Project Developer’s Vision Two LNG terminals were planned by Dragon LNG and South Hook LNG for Milford Haven to process gas 
imports,  requiring new connecting pipelines to run the length of length of South Wales to Tirley in 
Gloucestershire (a total of 316km), for which National Grid was responsible.  The pipelines are designed to run 
at high pressure (a maximum 95barg) and are buried at a minimum of one metre underground.  For several 
kilometres, the pipeline runs through the Brecon Beacons National Park. 
Most of the pipeline construction took place during 2006 with its official opening in November 2007 prior to 
commissioning in early 2008, with some reinstatement continuing after this.  Imported gas is now supplied 
across South Wales and into England through this route.  However, the pipeline is currently unable to run at its 
maximum capacity due to planning issues for the Pressure Reduction Installation (PRI) at Tirley in 
Gloucestershire.  
Story The LNG terminals in Milford Haven caused well reported controversy because of public fears over safety, 
which was not helped by the harbour authorities refusing to hand over risk assessment documents.  This 
controversial reputation was transferred to the pipeline, and proved difficult to completely shake off, although 
National Grid made good efforts to engage the many stakeholders along the route of the pipeline.  
Three sites along the pipeline sparked opposition: Trebanos, Cilfrew and Brecon.  Where the pipeline had to 
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pass through the Brecon Beacons National Park there was public concern.  Local opponents (concerned 
primarily about safety) and national campaigning groups (concerned primarily about climate change and the use 
of fossil fuels) joined forces, and took on each others’ concerns.  This resulted in two protest camps which were 
forcibly evicted, leading to negative (mostly local) media coverage.  Local politicians, and some Welsh 
Assembly representatives, actively opposed the project.  Political support was an important contributing factor 
to successful opposition.  The project was portrayed by many Welsh stakeholders as benefiting the English at 
risk to the Welsh.  Citizens petitioned, taking a planning decision to the High Court where it was overturned, 
and another court battle was fought and lost by the protestors.  In Trebanos, where explosives were to be used, 
citizens commissioned a professional geological survey to provide evidence for their concerns about landslides 
and earthquakes - National Grid acknowledged the local residents’ concerns and used alternative mechanical 
digging to undertake the work. 
Despite all this, National Grid did enjoy quiet support from landowners and some residents. National Grid 
conducted an extensive dialogue with statutory stakeholders, and local relations were helped by its policy of 
employing local Welsh-speaking staff to facilitate communication work and by careful planning and 
engagement over the route of the pipeline.  The pipeline was completed on schedule. 
Stakeholders involved  National Grid 
835 Landowners, all of whom must give permission. 
Local residents   
Local Campaigning groups (“Safe Haven”, “Cilfrew Residents Association”, “Cwmtawe Residents’ 
Association”)  
  
 
146 
National global warming protest groups “Climate Camp for Action” and “Rising Tide” 
Local Media 
National Media 
Local Authorities 
National and local politicians including Welsh Assembly members 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
During the route planning phase, extensive consultation was conducted between key stakeholders including 
landowners, the Environment Agency (Wales), local authorities, members of parliament and the Welsh 
Assembly, and national park authorities. National Grid considers that a good relationship with landowners is 
essential to its business and early engagement important. 
Following a route decision, public consultations and meetings with communities and their local elected 
representatives commenced.   
Location analysis Wales has a strong independent cultural identity separate to England.  The pipeline was portrayed by some local 
media sources and by some Welsh politicians as an English project providing little benefit to the Welsh 
themselves.  The devolved Welsh parliament gained new powers around the time of this project, which could 
have encouraged the parliament to be more active in its protest. 
South Wales has high unemployment and a lot of closed coal mines, implying an ambivalent relationship to 
industry. 
Milford Haven is one of the busiest ports in the country 
Outcome in terms of project The project was build on time and pretty much as planned.  
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developer’s aim 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
Much of the media coverage, especially print, was negative, with the pipeline portrayed as controversial and 
sometimes as dangerous.   A Guardian quote which gained popularity amongst some circles was “it wouldn’t be 
built in Surrey!”  
The protests also received a lot of media attention. 
Lessons Once a bad reputation was established it was hard to shake off - the bad reputation earned through the LNG 
terminals transferred onto the pipeline.  Poor engagement and decisions by developers of the LNG terminals and 
by some local authorities reflected badly upon National Grid, even though the issues were out of its control. 
Local and national protest groups joined together, taking on each others’ causes.  The joining of citizen protest 
groups, national campaigning groups and local and regional politicians contributed to the limited success of the 
opposition. 
The issue occurred in the political context of Wales’ feelings of subjugation by the English, and Welsh 
Assembly resistance to the pipeline served partly to reinforce the status and power of the Welsh Assembly.   
National Grid's careful planning and early engagement with stakeholders and local communities about the 
pipeline routeing was important to project success, and the employment of local staff who spoke Welsh, helped 
improve trust levels.    
Note: This case study draws heavily on work by Riesch and Reiner in the NearCO publication (Desberats et al 2010).
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Case Study  Rossport, Count Mayo, Ireland  
Type of project Gas pipeline, onshore gas processing terminal 
Developer (Enterprise Energy Ireland (EEI) 1996 – 2002)Shell (from 2002 – present), StatoilHydro and Marathon Oil. 
Project Developer’s Vision Shell planned to build a high pressure pipeline from the Corrib offshore gasfield, transporting ‘raw’ gas for 
processing on shore in Bellanaboy.  The pipeline would run 80 km offshore and 9 km onshore, maximum design 
pressure of 345 bar offshore and 144 bar operating pressure for the onshore section of the pipeline. The project is 
expected to deliver 60% of Ireland’s gas requirement during peak production.  The project was originally 
planned to be operational by 2010/2011. 
Story This is a worst case scenario for any project.  Stakeholder relations became completely oppositional, resulting in 
prison sentences, violence, escalating project costs, long delays and extremely bad media coverage.  Over 30 
protest events were held most of which halted work temporarily and involved police and private security 
personal.  At least 50 arrests have been made to date.   
In 2000 the project was announced by EEI but the local community felt they had not been adequately consulted 
about the development, and that it posed risks to their health and land.  Twice they appealed to the planning 
board, and some changes were made but it seemed to objectors that the issue was of national strategic 
importance and was pushed through with inadequate attention paid to their concerns.  Compulsory purchase 
orders were signed for 34 residents, 28 of whom were in favour of the project. When, in 2005, five local people  
ignored a court injunction and interfered with preparatory works, they were jailed for 94 days.  Throughout 2005 
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and up to the present day direct actions – i.e.  picket lines, protests, occupations, disruptions and more – have 
disrupted the construction phase of the project.  Although protesters have been largely peaceful, the Gardaí have 
broken up protests using force, which became an issue for national debate revolving around the right to protest 
versus the right to go to work on a site where all the appropriate permissions had been granted.   There have 
been allegations of violence and of invasive and intimidatory behaviour by security staff employed by Shell  
although none of the complaints have been upheld by the Private Security Authority of Ireland and no public 
prosecutions have been brought against the security company.  Tens of arrests have occurred over the time 
period, two further prison sentences delivered, and it has been alleged by well known elements within the 
protestor community that masked men attacked and hospitalised one key protestor, and boarded and sank a 
protestor’s fishing boat.  It was suggested by protestor groups that the masked men were from Shell’s private 
security firm. 
Initially the opponents’ concerns were about risks to health and land, but they broadened out to include 
environmental impacts, an economic critique of the licensing terms of the deal between Shell and the Irish 
government and about alleged human right abuses of campaigners.  Independent safety reviews and mediation 
proceedings as well as community engagement from Shell came too late to mitigate the disastrous turn this 
project took. 
Stakeholders involved  Shell (and other developers)  
Local protest group – Shell to Sea 
Rossport residents 
Gardaí 
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Local Media 
National Media 
Planning board 
Local Politicians 
Minister for the Communications, Energy and Natural Resources 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Shell is committed to employing local people wherever possible, and estimate that the project will bring 1500 
construction jobs and 130 long term operating jobs to the area. 
A local grants program has funded more than 200 community groups up to €10,000 each. 
Community Liaison Officers meet with members of the community on a daily basis and their role is to listen to 
community concerns and ensure that they are addressed.   
A dedicated Social Investment Advisor works closely with local community groups and organisations to help 
deliver the Corrib Natural Gas “Investment in the Community” initiatives. 
Site visits are available and almost 2000, mostly local, people took part during 2008/09. 
A bi-monthly newsletter is published and quarterly stakeholder update letters are sent out. 
Besides these events, independent consultations and mediations took place. 
 
Shell stress that most of the people in the Mayo area are supportive of the project, but none of these activities has 
helped them engage with the people who are vehemently opposed to the project. 
Location analysis A remote and rural area of Ireland, which may have felt that it was being taken advantage of by the ‘higher 
  
 
151 
powers’ of industry and government.  Locals are mainly farmers and fishermen.   
Outcome in terms of project 
developer’s aim 
The project has raised in cost, and is now expected to be delayed by three years. 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
The case is infamous, with local, national and international reporting, (in 2005-2006) most of it negative, some 
of it neutral.  The image which Shell gained as a result of the jailings has not been favourable.  Greater 
community engagement since 2006 has ameliorated some of the negative reputational damage to Shell. Future 
operations in this area will be tarnished by the historical legacy of strong community dissent by very vocal and 
committed project opponents.  
Lessons Lack of early engagement with locals led to the whole affair.   
Better understanding of the local area, its cultural heritage and more flexibility and responsiveness to the locals’ 
concerns in the early years of the project, could perhaps have saved the process, and resulted in probably the 
same outcomes, notably that working gas pressure is reduced and the pipeline re-routed to be further from 
habitations and environmentally sensitive areas. 
Government interventions attempting to push through the project decreased local faith in the democratic process.  
The use of large numbers of police and of prison sentences further polarised the positions of opponents, and 
raised local national and international media attention. 
Detailed Summary April 2000– Project announced to public. 
July 2000– Government passes Gas (Amendment) Act of 2000 
November 2000- August 2001– Planning permission is applied for, denied, reviewed and accepted.  Planning 
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permission is immediately appealed to An Bord Pleanála by residents and environmental groups. 
October, 2001– The Minister for the Marine denies claims made in the Dáil by Mayo Fine Gael TD, Michael 
Ring, that he has been interfering in the planning process in relation to the Corrib project. 
April, 2003– An Bord Pleanála overturns Mayo Co.  Council’s decision to grant planning permission for the gas 
terminal, following the second longest oral hearing in the board’s histroy.  Shell expresses disappointment with 
the outcome and announces that it is now considering the future of the Corrib gas project. 
December, 2003– A new planning application is submitted by Shell. 
April, 2004– Mayo County Council grants planning permission subject to a total of 75 conditions.  Objectors 
immediately indicate that they intend to appeal the decision to An Bord Pleanála. 
October, 2004– Shell is granted planning permission by An Bord Pleanála for the Bellanaboy gas terminal.  The 
company announces that work will commence immediately.   
April, 2005– Proceedings are instituted in the High Court to prevent residents obstructing the construction of the 
gas pipeline at Rossport.  The High Court grants Shell the right to access private lands in the village for the 
installation of the pipeline.   
June, 2005– Five residents from Rossport are jailed for contempt of court for refusing to obey the High Court 
order not to interfere with the construction of the Corrib gas pipeline.  The men vow to stay in prison until they 
get justice. 
August 2005– Marine and Natural Resources Minister, Noel Dempsey, granted Shell permission to lay the 75 
kilometres of pipeline from the Corrib Field to the North Mayo coastline. 
Shell suspends construction work on the pipeline for one year.  The government announces an independent 
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safety inquiry and appoints an independent mediator to facilitate and assess local views and concerns. 
October 1
st
 2005– Thousands rally in support of Rossport Five in Dublin. 
October 12
th
 2005– A two-day public consultation organised by the Department of the Marine is held in 
Geesala, Co.  Mayo. 
February 2006 – March 2010 The Shell to Sea protest campaign begins direct action against shell construction.  
Over a four year period, at least 30 protests occured halting work and sometimes resulting in use of force by 
police.  Over 50 arrests were made, with much discussion in national media.  Some of the more extreme 
examples are given below. 
May 2006 The Advantica Independent Safety Review published, mostly supportive of the project, but makes 
recommendations including halving the pressure of the onshore pipeline to 144 bar. 
July 2006 – Independent mediator Peter Cassells' report is published, concluding that the majority of people in 
Rossport, the wider Erris area and Co.  Mayo are in favour of the project 
September 26
th
 2006 – Protestors form picket lines outside the Bellanboy refinery construction site, preventing 
workers access.  The first attempt by Garda to break pickets fails. 
October 3
rd
 2006 –Some 170 Gardaí are deployed to police the protest at Bellanaboy, at the cost of millions of 
euro. 
November 10
th
 2006 – Injuries as Garda baton charge protesters to allow Shell convoy through.  Press coverage 
is not positive of violent police intervention. 
January 2007 – Alternative pipeline routes are investigated. 
14
th
 June 2007 - Following several years of campaigning with Shell to Sea, Green Party TD Eamonn Ryan is 
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appointed Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources with responsibility for the Corrib Gas 
project.  This is the only supportive political involvement that the opposition campaign received. 
April 2008 – A new pipeline route is announced, doubling distance from households and decreasing pressure. 
September 2008 – The shipping vessel Solitaire arrives to lay the offshore pipeline – Maura Harrington begins 
hunger strike, and local fisherman Pat O'Donnell arrested to prevent him obstructively (but legally) fishing in the 
bay. Device found outside Shell HQ in Dublin is detonated by the Army. (19th September) Maura Harrington 
ends her hunger strike. 
April 13
th 
2009– Prominent anti Corrib protestestor Willie Corduff  alleges that he was attacked and hospitalised 
by several masked men in the dead of night while taking part in a protest at a Shell compound.  The Irish 
Director of Public Prosecusions subsequently found that the security company against whom the allegations 
were laid had no case to answer. 
April 16
th 2009– An employee of IRMS, the private security firm hired by Shell, was shot dead in Bolivia by 
special forces, accused of involvement in a coup plot.  Four other members of IRMS were reputed to be with 
Michael Dwyer prior to the time he was killed in Bolivia.  This added further speculation as to the legitimacy of 
the IRMS. 
June 11
th 2009– Pat O'Donnell's boat the 'Iona Isle' was boarded by four masked men and sunk out at sea. 
November 2009 – The planning board says a section of the revised pipeline route is unacceptable because of its 
proximity to housing. Another route must be found for the pipeline.  Some high level mainstream politicians 
voice approval that the opponents ‘have been listened to’. 
February 11
th
 2010 – Pat O’ Donnell was jailed for 7 months for breach of the peace and obstructing a garda, 
  
 
155 
during the 2008 protests against the Solitaire offshore pipeline vessel. 
February 2010 – Shell apply for permission to conduct site investigations in Sruwaddacon estuary as part of its 
research for an alternative route for the pipeline.  One hundred and thirty letters of opposition are received by the 
planning board.  The deadline for the next pipeline planning application is 31st May 2010. 
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Case Study  Saltfleetby, Lincolnshire, UK  
Type of project Onshore Gas Storage 
Developer WinGas 
Project Developer’s Vision WinGas plan to convert the Saltfleetby gasfield into a gas storage site with 700 million m³ capacity.  Gas would 
arrive in the coastal village of Theddlethorpe, be pumped under low pressure to Saltfleetby where three 
compressors would compress the gas and inject it 2.5 km underground.  WinGas originally planned to be 
operating by 2009. 
Story After the project was announced in 2006, the project was opposed by the local authority, and by local publics 
including the Residents Association.  This led to planning permission difficulties, and finally in 2008 an 
application was made to DECC for a Storage Authorisation Order and Compulsory Purchase Orders; both of 
which were perceived as an attempt to overrule local opposition.  The outcome is still pending, and a public 
inquiry underway. 
Locals objected on the grounds of dis-amenity including noise from compressors and the industrialisation of a 
greenfield site; insufficient road access and visual impact; safety, proximity to a local school and insufficient 
emergency services.  The main request was that the compressors be sited in Theddlethorpe which has existing 
industrial developments, and high pressure gas be transported by pipeline to Saltfleetby.  WinGas object to this 
because of logistical difficulties, cost and increased risk, although the numbers have not been made public.  
There have also been suggestions that offshore storage may be preferable.   
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Stakeholders involved  WINGAS Storage UK (project will be safe and beneficial) 
Local Publics (project will intrude and may be dangerous) 
District and Parish Councils (inappropriate and possibly dangerous) 
Lincolnshire County Council (inappropriate and possibly dangerous) 
Environment Agency (potential for flood risk) 
DECC & BERR (project may be of national importance, and central government may have the right to impose 
the project) 
Engagement and 
communication processes 
Thorough engagement strategy, including informal face to face meetings, drop-in surgeries, public meetings, 
parish council meetings, workshops, a citizens’ panel and a consultation panel; as well as independent 
assessments of geological viability.  However, it is not clear whether engagement was early and proactive.  Print 
and electronic information was provided, and local media engaged.   
Despite this, it seems that local publics do not want the project.  Interestingly, it seems that local groups believe 
the developer’s explanation of likely impacts and risks, and as such trust relations have not broken down; but 
where the developer considers these acceptable, the locals do not. 
Location analysis A rural and picturesque region, very flat, and generally in a good economic state.  Tourism provides some 
income, and there is scepticism that gas jobs will go to locals.  Locals perceive the place as an escape from 
modern or industrial pressures, and feel that the gas extraction, along with two wind farms, has been enough 
development.   
Outcome in terms of project The project has been delayed by approximately three years, and is still not guaranteed to go ahead.   
  
 
158 
developer’s aim 
Outcome in terms of 
communication and 
engagement 
A good engagement strategy has not led to a breakdown in relations or trust between local stakeholders and the 
developer, although the decision to go to national government may have strained this.  Despite the good 
engagement strategy, WinGas has not taken sufficient account of stakeholders’ concerns to placate them.    
Lessons The onshore project is contentious because of proximity to habitation, and the dis-amenity this creates.  Risk is 
also a primary concern, and decreases in house value.  Offshore storage was suggested as preferable.   
Poor social fit with area – residents to not want more industrial development in their rural area, and do not need 
or see benefit in the jobs.  Indeed, it was thought that the project could damage the local tourist economy.   
Even without a breakdown in relations between developer and local stakeholders, agreement was not 
forthcoming: the engagement strategy did not result in satisfactory re-visioning of the project to resolve the 
dispute. 
Detailed Summary Late 2004 – WinGas purchased the Saltfleetby gas field from UK ROC oil. 
January 2006 – WinGas announced its intention to convert the gas field to a storage facility. 
May 2006 – The proposal was objected to by the local authority. 
2007 – During this year the project began to be held up by local planning objections.  EIA published.  
Independent review of geological viability by independent experts – including the British Geological Survey at 
the request of the local council. 
February 2008 – Earthquake in Market Rasen (15 miles from site). 
October 2008 – Submission of to DECC for a Storage Authorisation Order, permitting WinGas to store natural 
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gas.  This included responses to public and statutory consultees.   
December 2009 – January 2010 Public Inquiry held, to investigate the storage authorisation order (2008) and the 
compulsory purchase orders (2009).  The outcome has not been published yet. 
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